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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines territorial authoritarian threats to the Western world through
an examination of historical and contemporary case studies. The historical examples used
in this thesis are from Eastern Europe, since it had many chances to engage in
international law with the authoritarian state, leading its people to understand the nature
of one of the oldest authoritarian states: Russia. The four case studies used are: 1) Treaty
of Brest-Litovsk (1918), 2) Soviet Invasion of Poland (1939-1940), 3) Soviet Occupation
of Baltic states (1939-1945), and 4) Russian Annexation of Crimea (2014). Meanwhile,
the thesis presents a table of predictions to theorize on the success/outcomes of territorial
invasions from the expansionist authoritarian state while using past observations as
reliable references. However, the core question of the thesis is to examine whether
military aid serves as the best deterrence against authoritarian invasion, or potential
attacks. Lastly, while using existing academic literature and primary resources, this work
also notes how the authoritarian regime uses international law and the community’s trust
to advance its own agenda while creating a veneer of a trustworthy democratic partner.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The expansion of the European Union, shared liberal democratic norms of
governance, and remarkable cooperation on the continent have led to optimistic
assessments of the efficacy of international law and shared values and norms. More
pessimism is warranted. The 2014 invasion and annexation of Ukraine’s peninsula by
Russia showed that territorial revanchism was alive and should be considered as a big
threat to both East and West of Europe.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia moved to rebrand itself as a democracy,
and in the 1990s did begin to build institutions that resembled a democracy. With this
change of image, Russia began to join international organizations such as the WTO,
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and, surprisingly, even the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), in addition to the trappings of international
law and the normative language of Europe and the West. However, by the time of the
2014 events in Europe, Russia had proved itself to be a competitive authoritarian regime
rather than a democracy. However, the country still surprisingly maintained its
membership in international organizations and outwardly participated in the institutions
of international law even though many of their actions were abrogations of legal
commitments. At the same time, Russia’s neighbors continued to use the framework of
international law in their diplomatic and security relations with the country, even as
Russia often abandoned these same principles. This contrast motivates this thesis: why
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many sovereign governments continue to pursue international legal commitments while
others simply use these agreements to advance their own narrow agenda.
As this thesis will demonstrate, there are many historic signs and expectations that
should have warned the European West and its allies in America not to credit post-Soviet
Russia as an overly trustworthy partner or consider treating it as an equally democratic
state. However, because some scholars assumed that Russia moved away from its long
authoritarian or totalitarian past after the end of the Cold War,1 today there exists a
naivete that Western European countries and their allies still hold when it comes to the
rebranded Soviet Russia.
In many ways, Russia’s actions follow a standard realist playbook. However, as
realist scholar Mearsheimer once pointed out, “intentions can change quickly, so a state’s
intentions can be benign one day and hostile the next.”2 It appears, nonetheless, that some
of the European and American scholars and leaders are following a liberal playbook and
assuming the opposite as if one’s neighbor is going to act the same way or will have
similar values like oneself. As Mearsheimer argued, “the great powers... are always
searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with hegemony as their final
goal.”3 From this perspective, the liberal embrace of international law is a far departure
from the mechanisms of the real world.
Consequently, although some international leaders may believe that the mission to
spread democracy and its values has been largely successful,4 and there is no need to
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Mikael Baaz. International law is different in different places: Russian interpretations and outlooks.
(International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2016) p.272.
2
John J. Mearsheimer. The tragedy of Great Power politics. (New York: Norton, 2001) p.31.
3
Ibid.
4
Liz Ford. Obama: 'The World Has Never Been Healthier, Wealthier or Less Violent'. (The Guardian,
2017).
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worry about territorial sovereignty or rather a territorial claim anymore (at least when
compared to the 20th century), such a perspective is a mistake. Although the Western
European countries have majorly succeeded in achieving democracy and trying to sustain
their values and encouraging other states to follow a similar set of values through
economic and other cooperation, these assumptions are neither pragmatic nor realistic.
The recent annexation of Eastern European territories has shown the unstable relation
between the Western European leaders and Russia. Additionally, the potential threat of
Russian intervention into the domestic politics of Western European countries is attached
to treating the idea of the authoritarian-Russian danger as a myth. Moreover, supposing
that Eastern Europe will effectively work as the primary buffer against Russian
authoritarianism and intervention, where its seizure will end Russia’s strive for territorial
expansion, is also a misguided conclusion.
In this thesis, I argue that the threat of Russia’s authoritarian objective to invade
European territories and its resources is as real as it was in the 20th century. Furthermore,
although it might seem that authoritarian Russia has rebranded its name and regime to
become closer and seem more trustworthy to its European neighbors, in actuality, Russia
has not forgotten its broader goals of territorial expansion and regional dominance.
The thesis primarily focuses on one authoritarian actor - today known as the
Russian Federation - which was previously known for various invasions and
dispossessions of European resources under the name of the Soviet Union, and even
before that, the pre-Soviet Russia or the All-Russian Imperia. However, one should
recognize that although it might seem at first that there are two different regimes - Soviet
Russia and the current Russian Federation - the change in its appearance is minimally
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meaningful to the policy, as the change was in name only. This particular authoritarian
actor has not reformed its methods, leaving its strategy, tools, and ways of using
fundamental values of international relations to the advantage of its goals of territorial
expansion, with the same set of policies, tools, and rhetoric used throughout the 20th
century. In this thesis, I argue that the authoritarian regime’s apparent reliance on
international law and the community’s dedication to honoring foreign relations actually
entails an attempt to undermine the international order and, thus, endangers its future
existence.
Although there is not a concrete and formally agreed definition that would
perfectly represent what is meant by international order, the closest concise and
apprehensive definition describes it as:
a pattern of activity between and among states that sustains the basic goals of the
society of states, which include: (1) preservation of the system and society of
states itself, (2) maintaining the independence or external sovereignty of
individual states, (3) preserving peace, in terms of the absence of war, (4) general
goals of social life (limitation of violence, keeping a promise, stability of
possession).5
Hedley Bull argues that the main goal of the international community is to
preserve individual, sovereign states while also monitoring any external threats to the
social structure of stability of each individual state, which would essentially help out with
avoiding unnecessary wars, bringing peace and stability to social life (to citizens,
civilians, etc.). The core existence and continuity of life of the international order at this
scale depend on how efficiently Bull’s points are followed and if the international
community is willing to do everything possible to achieve peace as a result. However, it
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Hedley Bull. The Concept of Order in World Politics. In: The Anarchical Society. (London: Palgrave,
1977) p.16-18.
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is impossible not to witness how almost every one of the four key points is rejected,
omitted, or constantly violated through the 20th and 21st centuries in Europe by the
Russian authoritarian actor. The evidence presented in this thesis will suggest that the
international order, and thus peace, is indeed under a huge threat from the hidden (and
not-so-hidden) acts of the rebranded authoritarian state.
To test my argument, I use a case study approach that allows me to explore
variation across key variables. As will be described in depth in Chapter III, Russia
consistently uses similar international law and discourse tactics in territorial disputes.
However, the efficacy of these tactics differs depending on the target-state and the
strength of their international treaties, specifically their military support. These variables
arose inductively from observation of the events of the 2014 annexation of Crimea in
Ukraine. In that case, the biggest issues came from the insufficient military resources of
Ukraine and the lack of military assistance from its European and Western allies, who
provided only humanitarian aid. From this case, I was driven to see if this pattern was
more general. Given different configurations of state strength and outside military aid,
how would the efficacy of attempted incursions by an outside state differ?
As a result, the creation of Table 1 started with the conception of certain
necessary variables, as well as their definitions. At first, there are strong states, which are
constituted by a coherent vertical line of governmental power, with a balance between
society and government in place. In other words, as Max Weber puts it, “a state is a
human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of
physical force within a given territory…[where] the dominated must obey the authority
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claimed by the powers that be.”6 Following this definition from Weber, strong states have
clear hierarchies, where those on the top are able to plan policies and have them
implemented by those below them. However, one should not confuse it with coercive
power or regime, since I rather intended for the strong regime variable to represent a
mixture of a Traditional type of authority, which is “resting on an established belief in the
sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under
rule,”7 and the Rational legal authority, “resting on a belief in the legality of enacted rules
and the right of that elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands”8 where the
population sees such political order as legal, bringing in concepts like natural law,
normative order, and legal codes together. The mixture of these two, where one type can
prevail over the other, has the potential to show a relatively strong connection between
the government and its people, making the chances of fighting back successfully higher
and deserving the name of a strong state.
On the contrary, the Weak state is then somewhat of a state that lacks this
cohesion between the two parties to such an extent that in the time of an attack, especially
when we look at the authoritarian attacks, we see bluntness and non-cohesion between
the government, even within different bureaucratic groups, and for most - there is no
distinct cooperation between the citizens and the government; which leads to a higher
chance of confusion and thus - invasion. Meanwhile, the Diplomatic Treaties & Military
Agreements variable signifies the state’s interrelation with international law, agreements,
and diplomacy, topped with its engagement in military agreements as well. On the other
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Max Weber. Politics As a Vocation. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1965).
Max Weber. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (CA: University of California
Press, 1978) p.215.
8
Ibid.
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hand, the variable Only Diplomatic Treaties only pertains to the state having good or
even strong international relations through treaties and signed agreements, yet these do
not presuppose any of the military assistance in case of an attack or invasion on the state.
Table 1.
Territorial Disputes
Strong State
And International Law

Weak State

Diplomatic Treaties &
Military Agreements

Prediction II
- Possibility of
territorial invasion
due to weak
governmental
structure and
instability
- Successful
annexation =
however, due to
foreign military
aid, a chance
remains to
remove invaders

Prediction I
- Potential attempts to
invade the state could
be made but should not
be effective due to
domestic and foreign
military resources
- Successful annexation
= improbable

Diplomatic Treaties with Prediction III
no guarantee of military
- Stable and cohesive
assistance
government but no
military help from the
outside
- Possible occupation of
territories but constant
attempts to change the
status of being
“invaded.”
- Successful annexation
= possible, but even if
successful, it is not
maintained for
extremely long
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Prediction IV
- Unstable
government and
no cohesion
between its plans
and actions
- No military
support from
others (weak
weaponry
resources on the
domestic side)
- Successful
annexation =
evident and
possible to last a
while

Table 1 serves as a guideline to four predictions connected to the interrelation
between the different variables, which predict four different outcomes. Prediction I has a
strong state with robust diplomacy and military agreements, deterring any serious
occupation from the authoritarian actor. Meanwhile, Prediction II is when a weak state
has chances to be invaded by the authoritarian actor but also can extort them because of
its military agreements with other more powerful international state members. Prediction
III represents a scenario where there is a strong state but with no military aid from more
powerful allies, which marks the annexation more possible but decreases chances of it
being maintained for a very long period of time. Lastly, Prediction IV is when a state is
weak and lacks military aid from its stronger allies or partners, making the efficacy of
authoritarian strategies successful and the most long-lasting out of the other four
predictions.
Table 2 shows the events explored in depth in Chapter III, which includes case
studies on Eastern Europe-Russia relations. This chapter contains four specific historical
examples from Eastern Europe to test the hypothesis and see if historical outcomes
support or oppose the predictions made in Table 1. Since Russia is located at the border
of Eastern Europe, the case study is primarily concentrated on the Eastern European
territories, due to their close engagement with Russia’s foreign politics and its territorial
invasions, specifically in the 20th-21st centuries. These cases were carefully selected to
highlight variation on the explanatory variables: state strength and the level of foreign
support. In building these case studies, I relied on secondary sources as well as primary
sources like official documents, newspapers, interviews, memoirs, and documents
produced by government agencies to present a better understanding of the historical
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events and their outcomes. Therefore, the combination of the two gave me the mobility to
see if the predictions made in Table 1 held up to the real events.

Table 2.
Territorial Disputes
And International Law

Strong State

Weak State

Diplomatic Treaties &
Military Agreements

Prediction I
Case: Soviet Invasion of
Poland (1939-1940)

Prediction II
Case: Treaty of BrestLitovsk (1918)

Only Diplomatic Treaties Prediction III
Case: Soviet Occupation of
Baltic states (1939-1945)

Prediction IV
Case: Russian Annexation
of Crimea (2014)

As I address in conclusion, the dynamics revealed in the case studies are more
broadly applicable to other cases beyond the Eastern Europe-Russia case. Thus, the
question of this thesis lies within the issues of international law and relations, examining
whether military agreements can be more effective in deterring authoritarian aggression
from partaking in a territorial claim. As a result, to fully comprehend the reality and
urgency of the authoritarian threat to international law, I also consult various
international theories, such as liberalism and realism, to see if they have a potential
answer to the question of how to deal with authoritarian actors and their aggressive plans
for territorial expansion. It is then necessary to look at data of compliance versus noncompliance to understand why Russia has been engaging in international law, and if, as
suspected, why Russia mostly tends to pretend its involvement with the international
community and its rules, what are the motives? Chapter II: Theory And Commitment Vs.
Non-Commitment introduces theoretical perspectives and academic findings from
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international relations before diving into the details produced in the body of Chapter III:
Eastern European Case-Studies.
And so, the story of “The One Eyed-Man And The Wicked Boar” begins, where
the One-Eyed Man represents the Western world and its international order. The Wicked
Boar - inspired by George Orwell’s work - is one of the oldest existing authoritarian
states: post-Soviet Russia or the Russian Federation. While reading this thesis and seeing
how history has evolved, one can uncover the story of how the One-Eyed Man lost his
left eye and why he is not trying to get it back. We will also uncover why it is an
extremely bad idea to ignore the existence of a Wicked Boar living near one’s land,
especially when he is making plans to get Man’s right eye, claiming it belongs to him.
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CHAPTER II
THEORY AND COMMITMENT VS. NON-COMMITMENT
To further explore the dynamics of authoritarianism and non-compliance in
international law, as well as how to succeed in deterring such actors from trying to
occupy and invade territories, I first turn to two key theories of international relations realism and liberalism - and then introduce a third alternative. Although there are
countless academic and scholarly works dedicated to examining the essences of both
theories, exploring the core of these broad paradigms is not the intent of this paper. I
rather take a more narrow approach and consult with them to see the overall position of
each on territorial integrity and military takeovers.
According to the theory of realism, specifically classical realism, one of the
reasons why states might want to engage in military operations is “because the desire for
more power is rooted in the flawed nature of humanity, states are continuously engaged
in a struggle to increase their capabilities.”9 Therefore, when Thucydides was writing in
the fifth century BCE in ancient Greece, he essentially established the three points of
classical political realism: (1) states (or city-states) are the key units of action; (2) they
seek power, either as an end in itself or as a means to other ends; and (3) they behave in
ways that are, by and large, rational, and therefore comprehensible to outsiders in rational
terms.10 Moreover, while transcribing the events of the Peloponnesian War, many argue
that the philosopher also was observing political and cultural differences among city-
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Paul Williams and Matt McDonald. Security Studies: An Introduction (Routledge, 2018) p.19.
Johnson Bagby and M. Laurie. The Use and Abuse of Thucydides in International Relations (The MIT
Press, 1994) p. 132.
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states before and during the war, as it was a significant piece to understanding why
Athenians and Spartans acted and behaved in one or another way.11
Meanwhile, the liberalism theory illustrates a more hopeful prospect for the future
of globalized cooperation and unity because it believes that many states want to
cooperate, have a mutual pursuit for freedom, and want to share benefits, and such
characteristics and economic benefits will eventually circumvent states from engaging in
a war.12 Nonetheless, let us turn to the constructivist theory, an alternative theory that
should be considered when talking about Russian authoritarianism.
As a result, constructivists believe that it is essential to“[outline] the central
concern in… the relationship between security and identity,” as well as state’s identity
(and related historical and cultural experiences, when trying to determine the content of
its interests and thus the way this particular state will “act” in global politics.13
Additionally, the theory of constructivism also purports that “contestation between
different actors elaborating different visions of ‘our’ values and how ‘we’ should act,”14
which, as we will see, plays a vital role when trying to explain why authoritarian actors
should not be approached with the same (democratic or pro-democratic values) scheme as
the majority of the international community is used to show and receive from its closest
(usually democratic) partners.
Effectively, as the world has adopted at least the language of democratic virtues
and values, there has been a conception of everyone unanimously agreeing to the terms
and thus tacitly agreeing to honor them. In other words, as the liberal theory argues,
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(Bagby and Laurie, p.133).
Immanuel Kant. Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795).
13
Ted Hopf. The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory (The MIT Press, 1998).
14
(Williams and McDonald, p.54).
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“liberal states tend to trust other liberal states and to expect to resolve conflict through
discussion and compromise.”15 Of course, it should not be a surprise since it proceeds
with logical aftermath. However, as I state in the introduction, even though Russia may
have rebranded itself and given its legal institutions the veneer of democracy, such
changes should not be accepted too quickly as a sign of strategic or normative change
within the state. Instead, there is a need to use a more contemporary approach of the
neorealist school, where observing how the state acts at both domestic and international
levels leads to knowing if the regime has been fully replaced. I argue in this thesis that
the Russian Federation never shed its authoritarian skin and has continued its
authoritarian mission of military invasion and occupation since its times of controlling
and dominating the captured nations in the USSR. Moreover, if my hypothesis is correct,
the potential dangers certainly exist if liberal states “eschew the use of force in relation to
other democracies”16 and continue to avoid acknowledging the true nature and goals of a
rebranded authoritarian actor.
Consequently, because liberal states tend to associate the international
commitments with their alliances, the action gets embedded in the state’s domestic law
and institutions, which, when combined with the general respect for legal commitments,
enhances the ability of leaders in liberal democracies to engage in international law and
relations successfully.17 However, the described association might be shaken if an
unacknowledged authoritarian actor uses the system while not planning to obey the
international rules and follow the unwritten moral codex of international order, therefore,
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(Williams and McDonald, p.41).
Michael W. Doyle. Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2 (Wiley, 1983) p. 323-353.
17
(Williams. and McDonald, p. 273-274).
16
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using the method of international reciprocity, yet not participating in it or pretending to
do so, essentially implementing its authoritarian agenda successfully.

Section 1 On Compliance v. Non-Compliance
A core question in this section of the thesis is when states (even authoritarian
ones) do comply with their international legal commitments and when they do not. If
compliance was perfect, then concern over territorial integrity would be greatly curtailed,
and Russia’s neighbors would not need to worry. Treaties, in short, would hold.
However, such is not the case.
It is not a secret to anyone that various states and actors “instead of simply
‘complying’ with international legal rules may bargain in light of them, and around
them.”18 Therefore, realist scholars argue that international compliance is often seen as a
central problem for international legal scholarship, where the law is presented as a “real
law” only when it is accompanied by authoritative interpretation and enforcement; in
other words, a law which does not envision punishment - is a weak law, if a law at all.19
However, the followers of realism do not even give a contrary thought a second chance
since they believe that “ international law does not really matter, because the ultimate
causes of state behavior are to be found in self-interest in the face of an anarchic and
insecure world, not legal obligation.”20
Meanwhile, the liberal theorists perceive commitment and international law to be
fruitful and still effective enough to bring peace and stability to the international
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Robert Howse and Ruti Teitel. Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why International Law Really Matters
(Global Policy, 2010) p.127.
19
(Howse and Teitel, p.128).
20
(Howse and Teitel, p.129).
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community and order, especially when one looks at various examples of peace
agreements or disarmament treaties, where “international legal norms... have reciprocity
as their fundamental normative and/or functional premise.”21 Nevertheless, although in
theory, such premise should have been credible and stable, as the events of Peace of Riga
or a Soviet-Polish peace, as well as the Budapest Memorandum signed by various states
in 1994, had an opposite outcome to the initial liberal predictions, since the “reciprocity
as their fundamental normative and ⁄ or functional premise” has failed when engaged with
an authoritarian actor. Moreover, when pre or post-1990s Russia does engage in
international law and seems to be a loyal partner to the mission of international order, it
does so to late justify its actions in universalist terms, meaning to explain why one or the
other action of the authoritarian state, which usually would be deemed inexcusable by the
international community, is overlooked in the name of some justifying rhetoric.22
Though, it is important to note that unlike in more democratic countries where the
audience of rhetorical justification would primarily be their own citizens to build support
for going against the country’s established international agreements, a different story
plays out with the Russian society and its authoritarian mentality. Russian people support
its government’s actions of territorial expansion and abrogation of international
conditions within agreements.23 Rather, the primary audience of Russia’s rhetoric is the
international community and its leaders, who ask for evidence but do not require such to
have factual and solid grounds. Furthermore, it is surprising to see so much credibility
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Ibid.
(Howse and Teitel, p.134).
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Volodymyr Gorbulin. Crimea. War: Preconditions of Russian Aggression. (National Security and
Defense Council of Ukraine, 2016).
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and belief given to the Russian explanations when it comes to territorial claim since
historical evidence and data suggest the opposite:
(i) the country’s historically unique, on-and-off, and periodically antagonistic
relationship with Europe and, more broadly, the West; (ii) Russia’s
historically established tendency to authoritarian rule; (iii) its relative
weakness regarding the rule of law within [its own] country; and (iv) the
desire to maintain the territorial integrity of Russia as the world’s largest
territorial state.24
A discussion of compliance and non-compliance in international trade treaties
illustrates an example of how to approach questions of international law when working
with an authoritarian regime concerning territorial integrity. These studies on compliance
have yielded some insights into the mechanisms or devices, including monitoring,
verification, third party guarantees, self-help ⁄retaliation – that are all available to address
the concerns in regard to compliance. Because there is little trust between the parties and
no trust in the complete effectiveness of the international law, there is an extensive need
in having a third party to facilitate compliance. In the case of territorial integrity, the third
party is the presence of committed military aid from a foreign partner.25 That being said,
because international law “can provide useful communication and coordination
mechanisms where states seek to cooperate on the basis of mutual or reciprocal selfinterest… it cannot compel obedience against interests,”26 where military aid from the
third party, serving as a supporting element to avoid major disobedience in following the
terms of an agreement between the two parties, makes a great counterargument. One of
such examples, which shall be depicted in more detail in Chapter III, is the foreign aid
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(Baaz, p.265)
(Howse and Teitel, p.129).
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Ibid.
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provided by the Weimar Republic or German Reich in 1918 to the Ukrainian National
Republic, to effectively confront and remove Russian troops from its territories.
Given the overall skepticism of authoritarian regimes complying with
international law presented thus far, it is necessary to ask why sovereign governments
make international legal commitments in the first place and whether they have any effects
on state behavior.27 One of the simpler explanations is the reputational concerns that
make different states to disclose patterns of compliance. Thus, liberal scholars have been
arguing that “legal commitment has an extremely positive effect on governments that
have recently removed restrictive policies, which indicates a desire to reestablish a
reputation for compliance.”28 However, one should see the danger in applying such logic
to the authoritarian regime or any other regime that does not have deep intentions to
reestablish its values considering the regime or domestic/foreign policies. Only because
“liberal democracies are likely to commit to rules...and to comply with them”, where the
“norms are set and reputations are assessed among groups of roughly comparable
countries,”29 it does not mean the more-restrictive and unpredictable neighbors will do
the same. To put it differently, those regimes based on clear principles of the rule of law
(like American and European democracies) are far more likely to comply with their
commitments, since “they provide a stable framework of law and system of property
rights domestically are more likely to do the same for international economic
transactions,” as well as other international agreements.30 Therefore, with such
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Beth A. Simmons. International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International
Monetary Affairs (The American Political Science Review, 2000) p. 819.
28
Ibid.
29
(Simmons, p.832).
30
Ibid.
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intentional and abiding implementation, these “rule-of-law governments” have a lot to
lose from non-compliance with an international legal obligation, which is hard to say the
same with those “more capricious regime[s].”31
Consequently, one should ask if the Western world has been hard on those states
who have vigorously and continuously been engaging in the reputational costs of
reneging, and held accountable for their state’s behavior?32 Or have the European
democracies and its close partners been too lenient or a bit too “forgiving” with some of
the aggression shown by the neighboring authoritarian state? The case studies presented
in Chapter III will examine these questions in detail.

Section 2 International Law Means Different Things In Different Cases: Outlook On
Russian Behavioral Patterns
As described above, and as it will be seen throughout the case studies, the
“civilizational”33 values in Russia differ from the liberal democratic norms and values.
Despite Russian attempts to be “‘liberalized’ since the end of the Cold War, the country
is increasingly seen as an autocracy, in which freedom of press, non-governmental
organizations and academia have all been restricted in recent years.”34 Furthermore,
although some would want to imply that there is positive progress with the recent
showing of academic freedom in modern Russia, when compared to the USSR, it does
not automatically imply that international law scholars will be more liberal than the
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Ibid.
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(Baaz, p.265, 268).
34
(Baaz, p.268).
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government,35 and does not deny cooperation between them either. As a result, there are
Russian scholars who are critical of the classical liberal notion of the constitutionalization
of international law and the Kantian idea that the future of international law might be a
“global government.”36 Therefore, the Russian approach to international law tends to be
rather theoretical and philosophical when interpreting it.37
From another perspective, one of the fundamental characteristics of the Russian
understanding of international society over the past century is a strong belief in state
sovereignty as the fundamental principle in international law.38 Russia does not share the
idea of “popular sovereignty,”39 which in particular relates to a US constitutional idea. It
is rather only “the Russian Federation (i.e., the state), and not the people of the
Federation, that can be the bearer of sovereignty—regardless of whether Russia is a
democracy or autocracy,” making its sovereignty absolute, indivisible and unlimited.40
Russia thus keeps “international law itself at a safe distance from Russia’s domestic law,”
a stance also reflected in the country's position on international human rights law, jus ad
bellum, international criminal law, and especially when it comes to the issues of the
disputed territories.41 As Allison explains in his work, “Russia comes across as a pluralist
rather than solidarist country, perceiving a thinner set of common values than the
West,”42 whereas Mälksoo explains the Russian approach by looking at its Soviet
Russian practice of international law - “understanding of international law as a means for
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coexistence rather than as a means to promote cooperation.”43 In other words, what shall
be illustrated in more detail in Chapter III, are the different patterns of Soviet Russia,
which also can be seen in the Russian Federation, is the usage of international law to “fit
in” with other democracies and international leaders. Therefore, there are many instances
of Soviet Russia or Russia partaking in multiple international agreements, but only to an
extent it benefits Russia’s agenda. That is why Chapter III is filled with concrete
examples of international treaties and agreements being violated by the authoritarian
actor. However, as mentioned earlier, what is even more surprising, is that the
international powers continue to accept Russian propagandistic explanations and excuses
for violating the international commitments, thus further providing the “welcoming stay”
and putting Europe, in particular, under a big territorial threat.
Nonetheless, it should be further noted that Russia had never given up its plans to
try and create an alternative world to that of the democratic one, like when “Soviet
writers held that socialism was the inevitable outcome of social processes and—with its
triumph—the state and law (including international law) would be eradicated given that
they are the products of class division.”44 Hence, post-Soviet Russia continues to pose an
ideological opposition to the Western ideology of peace and cooperation, thus limiting
international law and its universalities. As Mälksoo emphasizes: “Russia’s commitment
to Europe is not as strong as Western politicians and scholars had assumed after the end
of the Cold War… [since] Processes of globalization do not automatically make different
places more similar to one another; nor is influence, from the West to the rest, a one-way
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street.”45 Therefore, it is in the West’s best interest to keep an eye on what is happening
in its neighborhood, especially when it has an authoritarian neighbor with a long history
of misconduct.
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CHAPTER III
EASTERN EUROPEAN CASE STUDY
Section 1 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918)
This chapter employs the comparative case method to study the questions
introduced in previous chapters. All four of the cases entail complex and dense events
within their own specific historical context. As we can see in Table 1, these four cases
give us insight into how authoritarian regimes act in regards to the treaties they sign, as
well as their overall behavior towards international agreements and commitment.
Terms for Brest-Litovsk case:
•

CCU (Central Council of Ukraine)

•

UNR (Ukrainian National Republic)

•

RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic)

•

CPC of RSFSR (Council of People’s Commissars of the Russian Soviet
Federative Socialist Republic)

Brest-Litovsk
The first case study addresses the events of a lesser-known treaty called BrestLitovsk, signed on the evening of February 9, 1918 in the city with the same name (today
located in Belarus territory). The signatories were the Central Powers (Germany, AustroHungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria) and the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR). As Andriy
Kudryachenko wrote, “for Ukraine, which had gone through many obstacles, armed
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confrontations with Russia,” this treaty opened a window of opportunities.46 Ukraine had
already experienced many conflicts with its neighbor Russia and struggled to maintain its
borders, culture, and independence. However, these opportunities were not only about
showing Ukrainian representation at the international political arena, since the Treaty of
Brest-Litovsk was the first international-legal act that recognized the UNR as a subject of
international law, but also dramatically tipped the balance of powers away from postrevolutionary Russia.47 Nonetheless, although the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk caused a shift
in this power-dynamic in favor of Ukraine, the question to explore is how and why did
Petrograd so persistently try to occupy Ukrainian territories in 1917-1918? Moreover, it
is essential to explore how successful the attacks and maneuver warfare was during the
implementation of the treaty, and what happened after the treaty was terminated.
The terms of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty included: the ending of military actions,
managing in or finalizing Ukraine’s western borders, establishing diplomatic and
advisory relations, stipulating principles of trading relations, and the exchanging of
prisoners of war and civil internee. Therefore, because of the treaty, Ukraine formally
achieved the status of an independent and neutral state, and as a matter of fact, also
became the major resource supplier (primarily in grain) to Europe.48 Nevertheless, before
looking into the complexity of Russia’s plans to make the most of the international law
and the dynamic of the international relation to use in its territorial claim later on, let us
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go through the most significant political events of the timeline to try and understand the
whole picture.
First, it is important to note that Ukraine, or the Ukrainian National Republic
(UNR), on November 20, 1917 had passed a third state-political act that proclaimed its
existence and gave it the ability to develop as an independent nation.49 However, on
December 22, the Bolsheviks and their military units disregarded Ukrainian statements
and seized Kharkiv (a city in Eastern Ukraine) to establish control over the city. With
orders from Petrograd and under the surveillance of Russian forces, “Ukrainian
Bolsheviks,” which were sent by Soviet Russia, organized the First All-Ukrainian
Council Gathering of 1917.50 At this meeting, the masked Russian Bolsheviks announced
Ukraine was the Soviet Republic and a federative part of Soviet Russia.
However, because the Russian Bolsheviks could not send all of their units to
Eastern and Central Ukraine, Soviet Russia thus gathered their strike forces in Kharkiv
and started an official attack on the UNR, moving forward to the western territories of
Donbas.51 Secondly, the head actors of Petrograd continued to present the following
events in Ukraine as a civil or domestic conflict between the Revolutionary Council of
workers and soldiers against the Central Council of Ukraine (CCU). Side note, one will
see that calling a “foreign intervention” a “civil conflict” is a common strategy used by
Russian forces when it comes to territorial disputes. As a result, these interpretations
from Soviet historiography are even sometimes trusted today, submitting to the idea that
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it was not a military conflict but a civil war,52 where modern Ukraine recognizes it as an
international conflict, with the extreme aggression from Bolshevik Russia (or RSFSR)
against the Ukrainian National Republic.53
That being said, the official documents state that military actions between Ukraine
and Soviet Russia, under Vladimir Lenin, officially began in December 1917 and ended
by May 1918. However, these dates do not consider various negotiations and ceasefires
made between the two states, which were consistently interrupted and violated by the
Russian forces throughout the course of the war. For example, on January 6, 1918, after
the two sides started the deliberation process for a ceasefire, the Russian commissar “on a
fight against counter-revolution on South of Russia,” V. Antonov-Ovseyenko, ordered a
general attack on January 7, 1918, on Kyiv on behalf of the Central Election Commission
created in Kharkiv (again, which was now under Soviet Russians).
Consequently, the Soviet Russian government then decided to send 32,000
Russian Red Guards’ “workers,” soldiers, and sailors into Ukraine by the end of
January.54 At that moment, because a large territory of the left-bank of Ukraine was
already under Bolshevik control, the Ukrainian government failed to successfully fight
back against the Bolshevik’s invasion since there were no military forces in place.55
Thus, the UNR was rushed into creating multiple army units to further battle with Soviet
Russia and its people.
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The unpreparedness of the governmental elite is one of the indications that the
Ukrainian National Republic was a weak state since the hierarchy of power was unstable
and lacked extensive foreign support.
Therefore, after the UNR signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on February 9, 1918,
while fleeing Kyiv to Volyn (because Kyiv was now in ruins after Russian Bolsheviks
had managed to get to it), the Soviet Russian expansion grew on Ukrainian territories. As
a result, after the treaty was ratified and active, the Ukrainian government understood that
they had to ask their new allies for military aid because of their own lack of military
power and resources. Three days after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was ratified, the
Ukrainian side had requested the Weimar Germany forces to have their military units
enter Ukraine to help restore the already occupied territories by the Bolshevik aggressor.
The Weimar Germany was not reluctant as it acknowledged the urgency of the situation
and gave the green light the day after the Ukrainian officials had requested military
assistance. Officially, German forces entered Ukraine on February 21, 1918, where they
and Austro-Hungarian and Ukrainian troops defeated and annihilated Bolsheviks’ armies
from all of Ukraine by the end of April 1918.
As a result of such military success, on March 3, 1918, the Soviet leaders voted to
utilize logic and referred to international law once more and Soviet Russia became the
signatory of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.
Although Soviet Russian leaders were still not too enthusiastic about accepting
certain sections of the treaty, like Section 6, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist
Republic (RSFSR) was obligated (to the government of the German block) to recognize
the right of Ukrainian people to self-determination and the legality of the Central Council
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of Ukraine’s (CCU’s) leadership. Consequently, the Soviet leaders also had to accept the
unquestionable legality of the treaty that the Ukrainian National Republic signed on
February 9, 1918. Lastly, and probably most importantly, it also envisaged stopping the
war between UNR and RSFSR.56
On the other hand, according to the terms of the treaty, certain Eastern European
countries also benefited as some were obliged to be left alone and separated from Russia,
such as Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, parts of Belarus, and Latvia. The Treaty of BrestLitovsk was setting the principles regarding the destinies of these regions, where RSFSR
was now restrained from intervening in Eastern European domestic matters. Furthermore,
it also had to recognize the sovereignty of these governments’ legal and international
relations, and to give the ability for these regions to determine their own fate.57 Hence,
after the RSFSR was forced to make peace with UNR, it immediately had to take out its
formation of Red Guards from Ukrainian territories and stop any agitation and
propaganda against the Ukrainian government and its civil institutions58 and establish
firm borders between Soviet Russia and UNR.59
Without a doubt, because of international law and international affairs, Ukraine
achieved enormous aid (largely military aid) from the Central Powers to deal with the
Russian Bolsheviks’ interference. However, it is important to emphasize that in this
particular case, Ukrainian territories were freed from thousands of Red Guards not
because of its long negotiations and tedious meetings with Russia but because of the
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military power that German troops provided to help in Ukraine’s international conflicts.
Hence, Germany and its military assistance gave a chance to stop Soviet Russian invasion
and eliminate the Russian Bolshevik and Red Army from Ukrainian territories.
Accordingly, here, the realism theory has proven itself to have a point on “selfhelp,” which the Ukrainian government managed not fully by its own means (due to
weak and mostly unprepared government), but through engaging with the Central Powers
and their commitments to the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. However, I would
also like to point out that if it was not for German leaders, who understood the nature of
Soviet Russian foreign relations and its tendency to violate new or old treaties, there is a
high chance UNR would have never deterred Soviet Russian forces successfully and fast.
A month forward, on May 6, 1918, after removing Bolsheviks from Ukraine and
somewhat leaving Soviet Russians with no other option but to join the treaty, the
representatives of the German-Ukrainian military forces and the RSFSR’s troops, in
Konotop, signed a ceasefire agreement. Such measures were taken due to occasional
attacks from the Soviet Russian forces, as they were still trying to set their people and
militia on Ukrainian territories, despite all of the previous obligations Russia agreed to
after signing into the treaty.60
Overall, the typical reader would think that the story ends here till the tragic
events of the subsequent massive occupation and loss of Ukraine’s sovereignty, which
unfortunately will come in a couple of years. However, for now, there was a cycle of
negotiation, re-negotiation, strategic maneuvering, another set of negotiations,
authoritarian plan-attack, all leading to another charge on Ukraine. Accordingly, based on
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the historic evidence, one should understand that the negotiation process did not mean
much to the heads of the RSFSR because they utilized it only to provide extra time to
gather more troops to initiate the next attack, in secret, of course.
Thus, the uncertainty begs the question what was the reason for a ceasefire on the
May 6, if in two weeks Russians would be asking for another deliberation on May 23,
1918? By the way, the second deliberation lasted only till October 4, 1918 and, again,
never led to anything as it was mainly used for stopping the Ukrainian army and its allies
from growing and acquiring a better position.61
If one could summarize the events of May, they would probably say, “Not
again?!” Moreover, just to illustrate the point a bit further, during the May-October
deliberations, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the Ukrainian
National Republic signed another preliminary peace agreement on June 12, 1918, where
the parties also established the line of demarcation - temporal differentiation of territory
between Ukraine and Soviet Russia.62 Meanwhile, the Ukrainian and Russian sides were
obliged to respect one’s sovereignty and domestic relations, though the RSFSR did quite
the opposite.
First, they violated Section 6 of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which they signed
with the Central Powers on March 3, 1918, in addition to the agreement about the
ceasefire, which Soviet Russia signed with German-Ukrainian military forces.
Furthermore, they neglected to follow the basic principles of negotiation. Why would
there be a need for another deliberation between the two countries if they had already
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agreed to peaceful negotiations? The understanding of what is meant by treaties was
probably somewhere lost in translation for Russians.
Nonetheless, the madness of these negotiations eventually stopped as one of
Ukraine’s strongest allies capitulated on October 5, 1918. Therefore, October 4, 1918,
was the last day Russians had to negotiate with Ukrainian representatives instead of
fighting them. Unfortunately for the Ukrainian National Republic, the Weimar Republic’s
capitulation before the Antanta Union (commonly known as Allied Powers) brought
expected nullification of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty by RSFSR. Now, Soviet Russia
was free from “following” the terms of the treaty and those agreements obtained during
Ukrainian-Russian negotiations. However, one should not feel upset, at least not for this
reason, since the Russian side was either way violating old and new peaceful treaties,
agreements, and ceasefires.63
Meanwhile, it is interesting to point out the most hated section of the Treaty of
Brest-Litovsk by the Soviet Russians, Section 6. Not only did it have “the audacity” to
ask the “Great Soviet Russia” to acknowledge Ukrainian National Republic’s
independence and sovereignty, but it also banned them from influencing domestic
policies and determining the next steps of the Ukrainian nation. Nonetheless, the biggest
obligation Section 6 entailed was the establishment of a Neutral Zone between UNR and
RSFSR. As a result, after failing to maintain control over at least a small piece of
Ukrainian territory, and a threat of having Ukraine and its allies fight on Russian
territories, it compelled the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR to offer
Ukrainian government to “stop belligerency between two states and admit a separate
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agreement to manage our borders and our legal relations;”64 funny enough, such
commentary came from the continuously belligerent state. Therefore, in May 1918,
Ukrainian-German forces and Soviet military delegations at the station Korenevo (next to
Kursk) agreed on the line that would separate the parties’ military forces. It was 10-40
kilometers in width from the line of Surazg-Unecha-Starodub- Novgorod-SiverskyiGluhiv-Rylsk-Kolontayivka-Sudzga-Belenihino-Kupyansk. According to the agreement,
both actors were supposed to take away their military units from this territory, which
received the name - “N.Z.” or “Neutral Zone.” However, the Soviet government had
different plans for N.Z. and actively used it to extract various grain cultures (this could
remind some of the leading events of Holodomor in 1932-33), as well as for preparations
to invade and occupy Ukraine in the future. Furthermore, the Neutral Zone served as a
hiding place for Soviet soldiers since the incidents in the summer and autumn of 1918
showed that the rising pro-Bolshevik units were running away to the Neutral Zone after
being defeated during the Anti-Getmanski Povstannya (uprising).65
Nevertheless, the Neutral Zone was also taken into exploitation, especially in
September of 1918, when the Russian government (special committee) ordered the
creation of two military units formed by the end of October. These units were to be the
center of the Kursk military unit (practically a Ukrainian front/border), created because of
an order from the Russian Council of People’s Commissars way back in March 1918.66 In
other words, the Soviet Russian leaders left all of their “good-hearted hopes” to stop that
“belligerency between two states” and had stimulated their troops in the winter of 1918.
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Hence, the cycle of war was never paused between the “always to be enemies”
neighboring states.67
As a result, at the end of this section, the appropriate lesson learned and facts
taken into future considerations from this case study would have to be:
1. As General Otto von Bismarck once spoke of Russians: “Do not expect that once
taking advantage of Russia’s weakness, you will receive dividends forever.
Russian has always come for their money. And when they come - do not rely on
an agreement signed by you, you are supposed to justify. They are not worth the
paper it is written on.”68 In other words, it shows that Weimar Germany (and even
Germany during the Third Reich) was quite knowledgeable of how Russia treated
those established treaties. Therefore, Bismarck notes that one always has to
control and make sure that Russia commits to the signed agreements, even if it
means having done so under 24/7 military surveillance.
2. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk showed that the Russian regime mainly understands
force and power, even when it comes to international law and negotiations.
Hence, international diplomacy in the classical sense (that being democratic or
pertaining to liberal theory) does not work and should be adjusted to the quality of
negotiation that authoritarian regimes understand - power and force.

Regular tactics used by Russian authoritarians during the period of Brest-Litovsk:
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1. Using periods of negotiations as a distraction to maximize one’s powers and
ensure extra time to collect more soldiers and weaponry to attack as soon as
possible.
2. Using Russian-made-uprisings of the working class or “Russian ethnic
minorities” (with no evidential credentials) as a justification for further attacks
on the targeted state and use such “evidence” as justification for the “righteous
intentions to save the poor Russian brothers” to the international leaders;
unfortunately, who tend to agree with these illicit actions, nonetheless.
3. Delaying the finalization of an agreement, where Russian representatives
come up with more questions and uncertainties in regards to the agreement,
which is then used to collect massive military preparations and forces to raid
the targeted state (i.e. N.Z. and Ukraine’s resources).
4. Russian government uses international law and fundamental principles of
international relations misleadingly and strategically against the neighboring
state (i.e. Eastern and Central Ukraine).
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Section 2 Soviet Invasion of Poland (1939-1940)
This case study addresses Poland’s fall to the Russian invasion in 1939. However,
unlike in the Ukrainian National Republic’s case, Poland in 1939 was a strong state.
Furthermore, as we shall see, it also had enough treaties and international agreements to
garner international support. However, even though such a powerful state had both of the
beneficial qualities from Table 1, the prediction does not follow since these factors did
not prevent Soviet Russia from placing their intentions to invade Polish territories. It is
also important to emphasize that the invasionist process was done while Soviet Russia
was part of multiple international agreements and various advantageous treaties with
Poland and other respectful countries. Nonetheless, the Soviet Russian officials
ultimately decided to ignore their obligations, thus allowing themselves to violate the
agreements’ terms. However, their approach was different since they decided to start with
occupying Poland by first negotiating preferable terms to the Polish government to put
Polish alertness to sleep while making more extensive plans to invade it a bit later.
One of the more essential agreements formed and signed before the Russian
invasion of Poland was the creation of the Peace of Riga on March 18, 1921, hence
ending the Polish-Soviet War in 1921.69 Because Poland was highly interested in the
Ukrainian National Republic’s western borders, including some of those from western
Belarus, the Soviets and Polish had come to plan for the division of these two territories.
The Soviets essentially promised to stay away from occupying those territories in the
future and let the conflict between Polish leaders and the Ukrainian National Republic

69

Britannica. Treaty of Riga (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2011).

34

play out (especially when Poland violated one of the agreements earlier signed and
established with the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists).
On the other hand, it is crucial to note why Soviet Russia was interested in having
so many states in its “union.” To put it simply, Russian leaders sought more voting
abilities at the UN table.70 To achieve more votes, they needed to have many federative
states under their control, with their already pro-Russian government installed. For
example, although the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was one of the Founding
Fathers of the UN, Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic were also part of the UN-creators. Therefore, one of the reasons why the
Soviets wanted to control many of the foreign states was to give the USSR (i.e., Russian
leaders) an immense advantage to set and push the Russian agenda at the UN meetings.71
In any event, there was also an outcome of the Munich Agreement of 1938, where
Germany, Poland, and Hungary took turns dividing Czechoslovakia since, like Germany,
the Polish government claimed that there were territories highly populated with its
people. Nonetheless, Poland’s and Nazi Germany’s pleasantries ended quickly after
Hitler demanded Gdańsk to be returned to Germany because of its Prussian and German
roots. As a result, Hitler argued for the creation of the Danzig Corridor. Despite
expecting and seeing evident pressure and further unfriendly intentions from Nazi
Germany, the Polish government also started to see similar signs from the Russian side as
the western and eastern corridor was closing on them.72
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Consequently, the creation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, also known as the
Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR), was signed in Moscow on August 23, 1939 by German Foreign Minister
Joachim von Ribbentrop and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov.73 The two
parties were forbidden from attacking each other and agreed to stay neutral when it
comes to third party skirmishes. Overall, the pact predicated no violence against each
other, “straightforwardly or through other parties or means,” as well as sharing
information pertaining to the interest of both actors.74 In addition to the publiclyannounced stipulations of the non-aggression between the USSR and Nazi Germany, the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact also included the Secret Protocol, where the leaders defined the
potential borders of the Soviet and German influence across Eastern European countries
due to the future “politico-territorial reconstruction” plans. Furthermore, the Secret
Protocol also recognized Soviet interest in Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Eastern Poland, and
Bessarabia.75
As a result, not long after, on September 1, 1939, the Soviet troops already
entered Poland, while on September 17, the Red Army under the name of “liberation
campaign” was already on the western Ukrainian and Belarusian fronts, which were
earlier given to Poland as a peace offering between the USSR and Poland. Interestingly,
the Russians later used this very territory to justify to international actors why Soviet
Russia decided to invade Poland.76 Therefore, Poland’s division between the USSR and
Germany was over by September 28, 1939, following a treaty of “friendship and border-

73

Britannica. German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2020).
Lysenko and Pulyavets. Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 1939 (Institute of Ukrainian History NASU).
75
Ibid.
76
Ibid.
74

36

establishment” named the German-Soviet Frontier Treaty.77 However, present day
Russian historians try to convince the international community that the reason Soviet
Russia decided to sign the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Secret Pact was to postpone
the USSR’s involvement in WWII. They claim that such a decision was made to win
some time to prepare for the war, strengthen their geopolitical position and their defense
capabilities, and advance the USSR’s technical modernization of military powers.78 Of
course, despite various pretenses made by the Russian historians, countless lawyers and
politicians worldwide argue that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact should be classified as a
crime against peace, as it concerned the interests of different third parties without them
ever being included in this pact.79
On the other hand, let us recognize a few reasons why the invasion of Poland was
achieved relatively quickly, besides acknowledging the obvious significance Nazi
Germany’s forces and partaking in the “division” of Poland with the Soviets. As a result,
it is important to emphasize that the Nazis and the Soviet Russians were acting together
as a unit, preparing for their personal goals to be attainable in real life. This particular
aspect is significant to underline because the world has primarily put the faults of Polish
horrors from the 1940s mainly on Nazi Germany, where the rest of the horrific actions
done by the Soviet Russians are omitted or somewhat deemphasized.
Accordingly, it is essential to acknowledge multiple preparations and unorthodox
ways that the Russian leaders used to capture Poland. As mentioned in the Secret Pact,
Ukraine’s and Belarus’s western territories were previously in the sphere of Soviet
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interest to seize, which meant that to attack Poland, Russians had to use massive troops to
charge simultaneously from multiple directions. Therefore, the Soviet parts of Belarusian
and Ukrainian fronts (mainly from Kyiv and Kharkiv) were primarily utilized as core
troops in Poland’s invasion. The general number of the first echelon of both fronts
counted more than 617,000 soldiers, almost 5,000 guns and mortars, around 4.8 thousand
tanks, and 3.3 thousand combat aircraft, while also adding 16.5 thousand NKVD border
guards to place with the other army units.80
In any event, one of the fundamental reasons why Polish forces were not effective
enough in defending their positions was due to the fact they were not anticipating any
hostilities from the Soviet Union. In other words, it is because the USSR’s preparation to
engage in Poland’s occupation began in the form of covert or secret military
mobilization. The Polish government had no idea about Russian mobilization being a
theater of war production. Secondly, the Poles were also sure if things did get intense,
their military agreements with British and French allies would serve them well against
the Soviet Russian peril.81 Even so, on September 3, 1939, the Politburo of the Central
Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) had other plans as they
decided to secretly extend the service of the Red Army’s soldiers and junior commanders
who had already been subjected to demobilization for another month; more than 310,000
people were held back for the attack.82
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Meanwhile, on September 6, from about 11:00 pm to 12:00 pm, the command of
the seven military districts, including KMD (Kyiv Military District) and KMD (Kharkiv
Military District), received a directive from the People’s Commissar of Defense of the
USSR, to conduct a covert mobilization in the form of a “Great Training Meeting.” It was
decided to summon all the registered staff to the “training meeting” to mobilize vehicles
and horses and organize food and fodder stocks. On September 7, in Moscow, Soviet
Officer Voroshilov held a meeting with the command of the districts from Kyiv,
Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkiv, Kalinin, Orel, and other parts of Belarus to prepare for a
large offensive operation on the territory of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus.83
As a result, on September 9, the People’s Commissar for Defense of the USSR
and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army issued orders No 16633 to the
BMD’s (Byelorussian Military District) Military Council and No 16634 to the KMD’s
Military Council (Kyiv’s Military District) to prepare for hostilities against Poland. The
command asked to provide a regrouping of troops by September 11 to “secretly
concentrate and be ready for a decisive attack to defeat the opposing enemy forces with a
lightning strike.”84 Furthermore, on September 14, the Moscow newspaper Pravda
published an editorial, “On the Internal Causes of Poland’s Military Defeat,” prepared by
Zhdanov, who was a Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The propaganda
served as an ideological explanation behind the Soviet’s entry into Poland; in other
words, to save “Western Ukrainian and Western Belarusian brothers.” Furthermore,
Zhdanov also emphasized that the Polish army’s defeat was not primarily due to German
military equipment and superiority, and not because Great Britain and France decided not

83
84

M. Meltuhov. Sovetsko-Polish Voyages. Military-Political Highlights 1918-1939 Years (2001) p.283.
(Meltuhov, p.111).

39

to go through with their military obligations to Poland. Zhdanov had claimed, “the
defeat” of Poland was largely due to the Polish state’s internal contradictions,85 which
had a multinational character where its national minorities were suppressed; hence the
“saving of the Western Ukrainian and Western Belarusian brothers.”
Coincidentally, on September 17, 1939, at 3:15 am, the Polish Ambassador to
Moscow, V. Gzhibovsky, was handed a note from the Soviet government, stating “the
Polish state and its government have virtually ceased to exist...[and] since the state is left
without leadership, Poland has become a convenient field for all sorts of tragic cases and
surprises that could pose a threat to the USSR,” making them act immediately.86
Therefore, Russians used their favorite tactic as intended, stating that in order to prevent
those “tragic cases and surprises” and to protect the lives and property of Western
Ukraine and Western Belarus, the Soviet Russians ordered the General Commander of
the Red Army to cross the Polish border.87
However, what is even more intriguing is that Zhdanov put out a big question on
the effectiveness or strength of Anglo-Franco-Polish diplomatic and military bonds. The
Soviet newspaper mainly referred to the alliance made between the United Kingdom and
the Polish Second Republic, the Anglo-Polish Agreement in 1939, which later resulted in
the Polish-British Common Defense Pact, including a French partnership called the
Franco-Polish Alliance of 1921.
Despite having a robust military union between Britain and Poland, it is
remarkable how little it seemed to have mattered to Lord Halifax (a senior British
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politician and diplomat in the 1930s) that Germany and the Soviet Union were acting
jointly. When Raczyński (a Polish diplomat) called in the Foreign Office with a
suggestion that the Polish government considered clause 1(b) of the Anglo-Polish
Agreement, which applied to outside aggression (but from a “European Power”) as
related to the possibility of aggression by the Soviet Union, Halifax’s response was
straightforwardly hostile. He told Raczyński: “As regards to Soviet aggression we were
free to take our own decision and to decide whether to declare war on the USSR or
not.”88 Moreover, the Chief of Staff of Britain and France had such a low opinion of the
Soviet military capability that this view reinforced the government’s later indecisive
attitude towards the Soviet Union, leaving Poland in the Soviet hands. Nonetheless, such
a tendency will be seen in a couple of years down the road, when the international
community will make the same decision during the annexation of Crimea in 2014.89
It is also arguable that if France and Britain had not refrained from a critical
reaction to the Soviet invasion and annexation of eastern Poland, it could have prevented
Poland’s following dismembering and division. Not to mention that a powerful military
reply could have prevented WWII overall if these Western European governments were
persistent enough in honoring their initial military agreements. However, of course, it did
not happen.
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Lastly, without any hesitation, at the sunrise on September 17, while never
declaring war on Poland, yet authorizing hostilities against its army, the Stalinist
leadership thereby violated:
1. The Peace of Riga (March 18 of 1921).
2. The pact from February 9, 1929, called The Kellogg–Briand Pact, also known as
General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy. It
was an international agreement where the signatory states were prohibited from
using war as an instrument of national politics.
3. Conventions for the Definition of Aggression, signed on 3 and 4 July 1933,
prohibited and defined aggression as:
(1) Declaration of war upon another state;
(2) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of
the territory of another state;
(3) Attack by land, naval, or air forces, with or without a declaration of
war, on the territory, vessels, or aircraft of another state;
(4) Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another state;
(5) Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have
invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the
request of the invaded State, to take, in its own territory, all the
measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or
protection.
4. The Soviet-Polish Non-Aggression Pact from June 25, 1932, and active until
1945.
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5. Violation of the Litvinov Protocol. It was signed in Paris on August 27, 1928, by
the Republic of Estonia, the President of Latvian Republic, the President of the
Republic of Poland, His Majesty the King of Romania, and the Central Executive
Committee of the Soviet Union Socialist Republics. The protocol was the treaty
of renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy.90

Furthermore, the invasion of Poland and further annexation of its territories caused
grave consequences like:
1. The disappearance of the Polish state from the political map of the world.
2. Mass arrests of Polish, Ukrainians, Belarusians (usually at 3-5 in the morning for
fewer witnesses) led to further Soviet Russian repressions (eviction to remote
areas of the USSR, arrests and imprisonment of intellectuals, executions of those
political prisoners perceived to be dangerous to the Soviet government).91
3. The events of Katyn Massacre (generalized name of a war crime) - mass
executions of Polish citizens by the USSR’s NKVD by a top-secret order of the
USSR's party-state leadership.
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Section 3 Soviet Occupation of Baltic States (1939-1945)
As we have already seen what Poland’s experience was like in its engagement
with one of the oldest authoritarian actors, it is time to follow the next target on the
Soviet authoritarian list - the Baltics. In the meantime, before diving deeper into the
Baltic occupation, it should be acknowledged first that Soviet Russia had never accepted
Finish, Latvian, and Estonian independence in 1920, which predetermined Moscow’s
following steps regarding its economic and foreign policies, on top of elaborating
military-strategic plans in the direction of capturing Baltic states.92
Unlike the previous two cases, this particular one starts with a bit of gambling and
paranoia from the authoritarian forces. Threatened by Hitler’s extraordinary military
successes in Western Europe, Moscow, in June 1940, decided to quash the perceived
threat and “shore up the Soviet military-political position in the Baltic.”93 Moreover, the
so-called “Baltic conspiracy,” or the events of a Polish submarine’s escape from Tallinn,
Estonia’s capital, on September 18, 1939, made Russian officials claim that the Baltics
were preparing to attack the USSR.94 Although this announcement was later used as a
pretext for the Soviet takeover of the Baltic states in the mid-1940s, the Soviets regarded
that because the Baltic states previously enjoyed their neutrality and did not intervene
during the Russian occupation of Poland and Finland, the Baltic states must be plotting
against them; which eventually was proved to be only a myth, well expropriated by
Soviet Russians.95
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Nonetheless, such promotion of “Baltic hostility” gave momentum to the Soviet
Russians to pressure all of the Baltic states and Finland to sign the mutual assistance
treaties. However, these pacts were built to benefit the Soviets, as they guaranteed that
the signatories would not engage in hostilities between each other, which played out to
Russia’s advantage while submitting all of the Baltic actors under its umbrella of Soviet
influence and rule.
It all had started with Estonia fully accepting the ultimatum given by Moscow to
agree to the Mutual Assistance Pact.96 Besides, the Soviet negotiators also insisted on
establishing multiple military bases in Estonia, to which the Estonian government also
agreed, gesturing its conformity with the pact. Meanwhile, despite obvious political
pressure from the Russian institutions, the Soviet press tried to reassure everyone and
printed out articles saying how the Soviets believed in the principles of independence and
national self-determination. At this point, Bolshevik, the leading Soviet Party journal,
commented:97
Aggression and the desire to oppress smaller nations are alien to the spirit of the
USSR. The Soviet people is [sic] interested in lasting peace and in fraternal
collaboration. This can be realized only if it is based on mutual trust and the
principle of noninterference in each other’s internal affairs. Because it respects the
sovereignty of other states, the Soviet Union does not interfere in their internal
affairs.
Notwithstanding, the following situation in due course awaited Latvia and
Lithuania, as the new Soviet-Baltic relationship not only signaled the return of the
Russian sphere of influence but also had foreseen the complete absorption of Baltic states
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the following year.98 After the Soviet Russian leaders had pressured the Estonian
government to sign the Mutual Assistance Pact on September 28, 1939, the Latvian
government was next.
Mistakenly, Latvian officials agreed to sign the pact due to their extreme belief
that Germany would serve as a military force that, in case of a threat, would step in
against Russia’s disturbance of the Baltic status quo or invasion of Latvian territories.
Thus, the decision was made, and Latvia joined the Mutual Assistance Pact on October 5,
1939.99 However, the most complicated negotiations occurred with the last Baltic state
during the Lithuanian-Soviet negotiation package.
In this case, the settlement’s finalized terms were harder to reach between
Moscow and Kaunas (a city in south-central Lithuania), where Stalin had to return an
ancient capital Vilnius to Lithuanians. As Stalin agreed, the deal was secured on October
10, 1939.100
Nonetheless, like with Estonia, all of the Baltic-Soviet pacts required the Baltic
actors to establish Soviet military bases all over their homeland by the end of October.
Around 25, 000 soldiers were stationed in Estonia, 30, 000 in Latvia, and 20, 000 in
Lithuania.101 To be exact, one should keep in mind that the placing of the Soviet troops in
the Baltic region was only the beginning of the invasionist plan.
Meanwhile, the vast majority of the Soviet Russian soldiers and civilians were
spreading Soviet propaganda around all of the Baltics, which eventually altered the
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countries’ existing political, social, and economic institutions, which ultimately led to the
public’s frustration with the government.102 The particular insertion of military resources
into the Baltic countries, overall, compromised their previously established neutral status,
domestic security, and the process of decision-making on foreign policy, where the full
invasion was still ahead.103
The year 1940 indeed entailed a different scenario for the Baltic nations.
According to the Directive of the Peoples’ Commissar for Defense of the USSR No.02622ss of June 9, 1940, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet (Soviet Russian Fleet) was assigned
the following to be ready by June 12:104
1. To capture all vessels of the Estonian and Latvian naval forces both at bases as
well as at sea, to capture the naval forces of Lithuania.
2. To capture mercantile marine and vessels of Estonia, Latvia, to disrupt sea
connections between these countries.
3. To prepare and organize the landing of troops in Paldiski [Baltic Sea port situated
on the Pakri peninsula of northwestern Estonia] and Tallinn [Estonia’s capital on
the Baltic Sea], to seize the ports of Tallinn and batteries [powerful strike force]
on the islands Nargen and Vulf, to be prepared to seize the Suurupi battery from
the mainland.
4. To block the Gulf of Riga [a bay of the Baltic Sea between Latvia and Estonia]
and the coasts of Estonia and Latvia on the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea, to
prevent evacuation of the governments of these countries or troops and property.
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5. To organize permanent and secure patrol service: on the Gulf of Finland - from
the direction of Finland, and on the Baltic Sea - from the direction of Sweden and
from the south.
6. To assist, in close collaboration with armed forces, the troops of the Leningrad
military district in their advance towards Rakvere [a town in northern Estonia; 20
km south of the Gulf of Finland of the Baltic Sea].
7. To prevent, by using the air force, the air fleet of Estonia and Latvia from flying
to Finland and Sweden.
After the intensive preparations, on June 14, 1940, Vyacheslav Molotov, the
USSR’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, issued a claim to the Lithuanian state and the other
two Baltic countries. Once again, Russian authorities claimed these countries were
conspiring against the Soviet Union and showing an anti-Soviet character in their actions,
thus violating all three mutual pacts between the USSR and the Baltic states.105 As a
result, because the Bolsheviks already had the upper hand from stationing many troops,
including the weaponry, in Baltic countries, and the terms accounted in the Mutual
Assistant Pact, ultimately cleared the path to annexation. Furthermore, given the
international isolation, as the world was busy paying attention to the fall of France (and
Nazi Germany’s expansion), the Baltic nations had to accept the Soviet ultimatum, giving
up their independence and accepting the future of coinciding with a communist coup
d’état.106
Although the outcome was similar for all three countries, it is important to single
out one of the strongest actors from the Baltic region, where Lithuania had one of the
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strongest governments from all the three, as we shall see. Its nationalistic government and
strong spirit to fight against the Soviet invasion107 brought an enormous amount of
uncertainty to the Russians when they finally achieved complete infiltration and invasion.
Hence, even after Lithuania accepted the ultimatum to be part of the Soviet Union, the
Soviet Russian leaders feared Lithuanian capabilities so much that they demanded to
arrest Lithuania’s highest officials in the police, and those Soviet Russia thought to
conspire against the Soviet forces.
However, one should see these accusations and orders as illogical since
Lithuanians were fending off the invaders and trying to protect their state. Therefore, the
Soviet stipulation followed with forming a pro-Soviet government in Lithuania while
allowing further settlement of the unlimited numbers of Soviet troops on the republic’s
territory.108 Nonetheless, the Lithuanian invasion showed the true nature of Russian
international relations when they gave Lithuania another ultimatum. Russians demanded
Lithuanian forces to surrender by 10:00 am on June 15, 1940, where Lithuanian answer
did not matter since Moscow promised to send their troops even if Lithuania surrendered.
Therefore, on June 15, Lithuania lost its independence while accepting the Sovietcommunist-ultimatum.109
All things considered, the Soviet leaders did not only occupy and annex
Lithuanian, Estonian, and Latvian territories but also had to show why their deeds were
righteous and provide explanations as evidence to the international leaders. Thus, the
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Soviet Russian officials believed for their whole operation not to be a military occupation
and annexation of the Baltic region, but rather a socialist revolution initiated by the local
population itself (which sounds incredibly familiar), and, coincidently, also demanded to
be part of the Soviet Union.110
Therefore, “local Lithuanians’ will” was heard as the full infiltration of Soviet
semi-legal procedures occurred, like overtaking the governmental institutions’ control
and installing Soviet Russia’s puppets and candidates into the government. As mentioned
earlier, the new pro-Soviet party, The People’s Seimas, later proclaimed the creation of
the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic and petitioned to be admitted into the Soviet
Union.111 Not surprisingly, the same procedure followed in Latvia and Estonia, as the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR accepted all three requests, proving that all Baltic states had
simultaneously carried out socialist revolutions and voluntarily requested to join the
Soviet Union. That being said, the Baltic states had to coincide with the Marxist-Leninist
ideology, create the socialist-Soviet citizenry, Soviet politics, and agree to the widespread
extortion of resources from private property, industrialization, transportation, banks, and
even the general commerce which managed the Baltic land.112 The Baltics’ occupation
and coercion continued until states regained their independence by the end of the 20th
century; 1990 for Lithuania, then Estonia in 1991, and Latvia later that same year.
One of the reasons why the Baltic events are presented in Table 2 under a strong
state variable is because of Lithuania and its extreme dedication to independence and
sovereignty. However, although all of the Baltic countries were trying to leave Soviet
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influence, Lithuania was one of the most persistent. Not to mention how much the Soviet
Russian officials struggled with occupying Lithuania through diplomatic means as well
as sustaining its rule after the invasion happened. For example, when the Lithuanians had
overthrown the Soviet rule two days before the Germans arrived in Kaunas, in 1941,
Lithuanian people saw the Third Reich’s occupation as a chance to gain their
independence back. Nonetheless, many would be surprised to hear that Nazi Germany
allowed the Provisional Government of Lithuania to function for over a month, but it is
true. Furthermore, as history tells when WWII was coming to its end, and the prognosis
was not looking good for Nazi Germans, many Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians
joined the German forces because they hoped that by engaging in the war, the Baltic
countries would have had a chance to attract Western attention to gain independence
from the USSR.113 Even though, despite the clear partnership between Hitler and Stalin in
dividing and subjugating Europe (from August 1939 until June 1941), the USSR’s allies,
Britain and the United States still took a pragmatic approach to the region, accepting the
de facto, if not de jure, and put Eastern Europe under the Soviet sphere of influence once
again, after the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945.114
Consequently, the British and American leaders had little interest in the Baltic
situation since their main preoccupation was with Nazi Germany. Hence, the Allied
powers were rather indifferent to the destiny of the Baltic countries and the Eastern
Europe overall, if it meant getting Stalin’s cooperation; though many argue today that if
the Western leaders waited a bit longer, the Soviets would come to them instead,
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imploring for help. In other words, the members of the Western world were comfortable
with sharing the authoritarian view of Soviet Russia that the Baltic states “naturally”
belonged to the Soviet Union and that such inclusion is in the interest of the European
states (“natural defense perimeter”).115 For example, here is what Prime Minister
Churchill wrote to President Franklin D. Roosevelt about the Baltic states in March 1942:
“The increasing gravity of the war has led me to feel that the principles of the Atlantic
Charter ought not to be construed so as to deny Russia the frontiers she occupied when
Germany attacked here... I hope therefore that you will be able to give us a free hand to
sign the treaty which Stalin desires as soon as possible,”116 to which President FDR
agreed, as the states of Eastern Europe were all given up to Stalin and his authoritarian
regime.
Moreover, according to the Archbishop, later Cardinal, Francis Spellman of New
York, who was a frequent visitor at the White House said that during one of the meetings
with President FDR in New York on September 3, 1943, FDR said: “The European
people [rather Eastern European] will simply have to endure Russian domination, in the
hope that in ten or twenty years they will be able to live well with the Russians.”117 Thus
later, FDR calmly envisaged Stalin acquiring Finland, the Baltic States, Eastern Poland,
and Bessarabia, adding that “There is no point to oppose these desires of Stalin, because
he has the power to get them anyhow. So better give them gracefully.”118
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On other occasions, FDR stated that because Russia was already invaded twice by
the Germans, “That is why we shall give her a part of Poland and recompense Poland
with part of Germany.”119 Finally, when speaking of J. Stalin, FDR noted: “He is just
another practical man who wants peace and prosperity.”120 Therefore, during the FDR’s
and Stalin’s meeting on December 1, 1943, FDR supported Stalin’s intentions, saying
that “he fully realized the three Baltic Republics had in history and again more recently
been part of Russia and jokingly added, that when the Soviet armies re-occupied these
areas, he did not intend to go to war with the Soviet Union on this point.”121
However, there was a similar talk going around in Britain as well. A year before
the end of WWII, Prime Minister Churchill had a meeting with Stalin in Moscow, where
they penciled out the post-war partition of Europe. As Churchill recounts in his memoirs:
“At length I said, 'Might it not be thought rather cynical if it seemed that we had disposed
of these issues, so fateful to millions of people, in such an offhand manner? Let us burn
the paper.' — 'No, you keep it,' said Stalin.”122
As a result, the phrase “history tends to repeat itself” is quite fitting as we are
about to move to our last case, and although it now happened in the 21st century, the
overall authoritarian background, tactics, and its approach should be familiar to this
thesis’ readers.
Nevertheless, per usual, here are some of the tactics used in this case:
1. Using international agreements, pacts, treaties as one of the ways to infiltrate the
territory that is planned to be annexed in the future (military infiltration and social
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propagation), no matter whether the agreement was reached due to mutual views
or through pressures and ultimatums.
2. Although Russian negotiation and ultimatum appear to have two options, the
Russian side does not actually provide a choice, leaving a negotiating state with
only an ultimatum.
3. Soviet Russia used previously established means of propaganda and civil
infiltration of Soviet citizens in the soon-to-be annexed territory to use as an
explanation why such invasion should be overlooked. Thus, using “the will of
local people” as a means to establish Soviet governmental structure while
spreading its authoritarian politics, social formation, and the overall
transformation into a pro-Soviet state.
4. The Russian slogan: “saving our people'” means nothing concrete for the Russian
state but is only used as an excuse for the invasion of one’s country. In other
words, when the Lithuanian government already signed the Lithuania-Soviet
Mutual Assistance Pact and was cracking down on disruptive leftist or procommunist elements in its country in 1939, one of the Lithuanian diplomats
revealed a part of his talk with Molotov (USSR’s Minister of Foreign Affairs).
The Lithuanian diplomat said that Molotov “had been quite understanding about
Lithuanian concern over local communist activities, and said the Smetona
government [quote] could shoot them if necessary.”123 However, the following
year Molotov expressed a radically opposite opinion on “pro-Soviet people being
in danger.” When it was convenient for the Soviet Russian leaders, the USSR’s
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Minister of Foreign Affairs used it as a reason to explain why the USSR occupied
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in 1940. Such comparison suggests that Russians
are more reluctant to “save their people'” if the targeted state’s regime is more
cohesive and coherent.
5. Lastly, as Kazys Bizauskas, the Activity Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania,
once predicted, “Russians apparently have learned the new art of warfare which
entails the peaceful seizing of territory from the nation to be despoiled...” but also
felt that resistance to such “salvation” would be instantly met with Soviet
“gunfire.”124
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Section 4 Russian Annexation of Crimea (2014)
The Russian-Ukrainian war, also referred to as the Russian Armed Aggression
Against Ukraine has been going on since the beginning of 2014 (related events are: the
Revolution of Dignity and EuroMaydan).125 The war has involved both direct and
indirect use of armed forces by the Russian Federation against the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Ukraine. The important events of Russia’s armed aggression
against Ukraine include Russian invasion of Crimea in February-March 2014, as well as
the beginning of war in eastern part of Ukraine (mainly in Donbas and later Lugansk)
between the undercover Russian forces and its manufactured forces such as the Donetsk
National Republic and the Lugansk National Republic (since April 2014).126
Although both events deserve equal attention and are complex in their own ways,
for this thesis’s purposes, I will be mainly focusing on the first component: the
annexation of Crimea in 2014.
One of the primary reasons why the example of Crimea’s annexation is fitting is
because it is the most recent attack on sovereignty in Europe. Secondly, because it has the
same but rebranded invader with now an alleged democratic regime. However, the reader
shall see that Russia’s preparations, strategy, and tools equipped are all the same. In other
words, the patterns of Brest-Litovsk in 1917-18, during Poland’s invasion in 1930-40,
and similarly to the Baltic occupation in 1939-45 can all be reflected in the annexation of
the Crimean Peninsula.
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After a pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych fled Ukraine in February
2014,127 his removal from executive power meant that Ukraine was finally coming out of
the Russian shadow of influence.128 As a result, Russian leaders faced a dilemma: 1) to
accept the collapse of its imperial project or 2) to resort to military troops and territorial
aggression.129 According to the previous observations, it is not unexpected the Russian
Federation leaned in favor of military aggression against Ukraine. Therefore, according
to the testimonies of separatist leaders placed by the Russian government in Crimea, the
preparations for the annexation of Crimea were first suggested by the Russian
businessman K. Malofeev and D. Sablin, a member of the Federation Council of the

127

“November 21, 2013, 1500 people came to the central square to protest the fact that pro-Russian
President Viktor Yanukovych had suddenly refused to sign the long-anticipated agreement on Ukraine's
associate membership in the European Union - a document that embodied the nation’s European aspirations
in the years following Independence. On the night of November 30, several hundred activists, mostly
students who had continued to remain on the square, were brutally dispersed by the police. In response, on
December 1, hundreds of thousands of people gathered in the center of Kyiv to protest the beatings. The
tyrannical actions of the police were the catalyst for people outraged by corruption, usurpation of power,
the regime’s Russification policy, and rapprochement with Russia.
Against a backdrop of Eurointegration slogans, the protest became known as the EuroMaydan. Eventually,
the protest moved toward a complete reboot of the state system known as the Revolution of Dignity. The
people demanded the punishment of the police responsible for brutally attacking the student protestors.
On the 61st day of the Maydan, the first two protestors were shot dead on the street. By that time, there
were already two more dead further outside the area of confrontation. Throughout the following month, the
authorities tried to force the protestors out of the city center. Most of the Heavenly Hundred heroes died of
gunshot wounds on February 20, 2014. [Not including other numbers] 107 victims of the Revolution of
Dignity have been officially identified.
On the night of February 22, 2014, President Yanukovich fled to Russia on a charter flight.” (taken from
National Museum To The Heavenly Hundred Heroes And Revolution of Dignity Museum).
128

Ukrainian justice department has found the former president Viktor Yanukovych guilty of treason by
inviting Russia to invade Ukraine and reverse a pro-Western revolution that eventually toppled his
government.
Yanukovych also was charged with asking Vladimir Putin to send Russian troops to invade Ukraine. The
Obolonskiy court in Kyiv sentenced him 13 years in prison.
Andrew E. Kramer. Ukraine’s Ex-President Is Convicted of Treason (New York Times, 2019).
129

Golovko, V. “Russian Annexation of Crimea.” Institute of Ukrainian History NASU, Encyclopedia of
History of Ukraine, 2019. history.org.ua/?termin=2.19.13. Accessed March 2021. (translated by author).

57

Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. Although Malofeev denies he had anything
to do with the plan of action, according to the Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta, at the
beginning of February 2014, with the initiative of K. Malofeev, there was an analytical
note sent to the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, which justified
the need to occupy Crimea.130
In the middle of February 2014, Russia moved from talking to acting, namely,
attempting to destabilize the political situation in Ukraine. Additionally, Russian
separatists also acknowledged that they played secondary roles, like infiltrating and
establishing multiple paid anti-Ukrainian rallies in Crimean regions, while Russia took
care of the major parts. Generally speaking, the intel says that the annexation-plan was
outlined during V. Konstantinov’s (is a Crimean and Russian politician serving the
current Chairman of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea) visit to Moscow on
February 19-20.131
Meanwhile, the official statement from the Security Service of Ukraine supports
the earlier mentioned intel by stating that: “The armed aggression of the Russian
Federation against Ukraine began on February 20, 2014, due to the first registered cases
of violation of international legal obligations of the Russian Federation in regards to
crossing the state border of Ukraine to block Ukrainian military units. Such violation was
first witnessed in Kerch Strait, where their military formations were already stationed in
Crimea, due to the Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the status
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and conditions of the Russian Federation’s settlement of the Black Sea Fleet on the
territory of Ukraine starting on May 28, 1997.”132
On the other hand, the Russian government also has evidence which suggest that
the beginning of annexation of Crimea happened on February 20, since such date is
carved on the medals awarded to the Russian servicemen - members of the troops who
participated in the military operations in Crimea in 2014. Furthermore, 200 of such
“awarded Russian members” were Russian civilians, in addition to 450 “Kuban
Cossacks,” whose mission was to block Ukrainian soldiers from trying to stabilize the
situation from the inside. More importantly, it should be emphasized that these sent-in
Russians were disguised as Ukrainian civilians to prevent Ukrainian forces from taking
measures. Hence, these undercover Russian troops and groups were responsible for
continuously constructing the necessary picture needed for the Russian and international
media to show “pro-Russian character in Crimea.”133
Nevertheless, on February 24, Russian Federation transferred more of its military
units, including airborne forces, which, again, would immediately remove Russian
insignias from their uniforms when landing in Crimea to prevent Ukrainian military units
from recognizing their military standing. Thus, a stream of Russian participants like
paramilitary and those “wishing to participate in military actions” organizations flooded
the Peninsula’s territory. 134 Nonetheless, a turning point for Crimea happened on
February 27, 2014, when Russian soldiers without identification (in the Western and
Ukrainian media, referred to as the “green men” because Russia denied them to be its
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servicemen) blocked the building of the Crimean Parliament and the Council of Ministers
of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in Simferopol. As a result, the meeting of
deputies of the Crimean autonomy was held under the barrels of Russian machine guns,
during which the head of the Crimean Peninsula was replaced by S. Aksyonov, the leader
of the “Russian Unity” party.135
One of the most popular Russian strategies that the Ukrainian government dealt
with at that time was the Russian cover-up of its servicemen and Russian “volunteering
fighters” in Crimea. Such implementation was used to try and provoke the Ukrainian
state to engage in a military operation, which would give them a chance to legitimize
sending its troops to Ukraine. Though, because many of Russia’s people already were in
Crimea and some regions of the Eastern Ukraine, the theater was mainly made for the
international community. Therefore, one of the pieces of evidence that supports
suggested idea is the statement made by the head of Russian Duma, S. Naryshkin, who
called O. Turchynov (an acting president of Ukraine from February 23-June 7 2014) and
threatened him on behalf of the Russian President, V. Putin, that if at least one Russian
serviceman dies, then Ukrainian government as well as Ukrainian soldiers will be
announced as criminals and will be chased all around the world. However, although the
statement is illogical since Russian forces had already infiltrated and invaded some of the
Ukrainian territories, it signified that Russian troops were indeed in Ukraine. However,
instead of crossing the Crimean border and utilizing the leftover military resources, the
Ukrainian government decided to use any possible international measures, following the
liberalist playbook.136
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The Ukrainian government decided to appeal to the international community,
particularly to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum signatories. The terms of the
“Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,”137 essentially known as the
Budapest Memorandum of 1994, confirms the following:
1. The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance
with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to respect the Independence and Sovereignty
and the existing borders of Ukraine.
2. [...] reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons
will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations.
6. [...] will consult in the event a situation arises which raises a question concerning these
commitments.
While referring to titles 1 and 2, although it is clear that the Russian Federation
violated both, the other signatories made little progress in coming together to consult and
decide what should be done to prevent further violation of “Independence and
Sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.” However, the lack of action was
resolved as some of the most powerful actors stated, the document which was traded for
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the disarmament of the third biggest nuclear arsenal, the Budapest Memorandum of 1994
“is not a security assurance agreement.”
Meanwhile, other nuclear states, like France and China (who signed the Budapest
Memorandum later and gave somewhat weaker individual assurances in separate
documents) interpreted its provisions in such a way that they themselves did not threaten
Ukraine and also have no obligation to force third states to implement the memorandum.
Additionally, France declared its support for Ukraine, while China refrained from any
statements. The Russian Federation, however, rejected taking into account the Budapest
Memorandum at all, since it was quite clear that Bismark’s remarks about Russia and its
respect for international legal obligations were accurate.
Nevertheless, on February 28, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine called on the
Russian Federation to stop aggressive actions while called on other Budepest
Memorandum members to reinforce Ukraine’s security guarantees. Additionally, there
were multiple invitations sent out to OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe) and the Council of Europe to confront the situation. However, after having no
substantial reply for two weeks, the Ukrainian government sent out another appeal to the
Russian Federation, demanding its aggression to stop and its troops to be called away
from Ukrainian regions. Meanwhile, Ukrainian officials also requested the guarantor
states of the Budapest Memorandum - “to take practical measures aimed at ensuring the
territorial integrity and defense of Ukraine.”138 However, the hope for the effectiveness of
the Budapest Memorandum was in vain since though the United States and the United
Kingdom made various spoken and written statements of their support for Ukraine’s
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territorial integrity, the two also indicated that the de jure document (Budapest
Memorandum of 1994) is not a security assurance agreement.139
After March 4, 2014, however, when Russian President Putin received the consent
of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation to use regular Russian troops to
begin the total invasion of Ukraine, some argue that the momentum was somewhat gone.
In other words, the Russian President knew that the events of an early election of the
President of Ukraine would make Moscow lose its main argument about the “illegitimate
power” in Kyiv after Yanukovich fled Ukraine to Russia.140 Hence, on March 18, the
“Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on the
admission of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation and the formation of new
entities within the Russian Federation” was signed by the self-proclaimed leaders of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by Alexey Chaly, who also
happens to be a Russian citizen. Thus, till March 21, Russian authorities quickly carried
out all the formal procedures for the inclusion of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
and Sevastopol as a part of the Russian Federation, thus establishing the Crimean Federal
District.

International Response
This section analyzes the international aid aspect of this case study. Therefore,
although there were many instances of verbal and written support for Ukrainian
sovereignty (from various presidents to their representatives in Ukraine) and them
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condemning Russian belligerence towards Ukraine, and even though some implemented
economic and political sanctions, there was no military aid in sight. Above all, the
Western leaders also discouraged the Ukrainian government from using any militia or try
to counter-attack the Russian Federation. In other words, Ukraine’s Western partners
were vigorously and persistently discouraging the use of the Ukrainian military and
weaponry to protect its territories from Russian soldiers and their attacks. Nonetheless,
Western partners later explained that these decisions were because they had
underestimated Russia’s aggressive intentions, which is similar to the outcome of
Poland’s invasion and its allies’ failure to follow through with their established military
agreements. Therefore, the Western European leaders and its American partners hoped
that the Russian military aggression would only be used to threaten Ukraine with
weapons and that the resolution of the conflict would eventually return to the normal
ways of political negotiations and diplomacy. Nevertheless, it is now clear that they
misinterpreted the Russian intentions by a big margin: the attacks and violation of any
international norms continue to be violated by the Russian government as of this writing
in 2021 (not to mention the current gathering of militia and servicemen on the new
Ukrainian-Russian border once again as of April 2021).
Undoubtedly, though Ukrainian military forces were in bad shape after the
presidency of Victor Yanukovich, Ukraine showed an incredible mobilization of its
civilian-made forces. These self-organized voluntary battalions were not only highly
effective in fighting against Russian forces in Donbas and Lugansk (the events of
“Airport of Donetsk” in 2014 speak for themselves) but were the most potent Ukrainian
power that deterred Russian forces from spreading deeper into Ukraine. Therefore, during
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the judicial procedure on the treason of V. Yanukovich, on February 7, 2014, Igor
Tenyukh, who was acting as Minister of Defense from February 27 to March 25 in 2014,
emphasized the significance of these quickly civilian-made forces. Moreover, General
Tenyukh also shared some revolutionary details on the Russian annexation of Crimea,
where he said:
I will speak frankly. Today we do not have an army. It was systematically
destroyed by Yanukovych and his entourage under the leadership of Russian
intelligence... Today, we will be able to gather a military group of about 5,000
servicemen from all over the country capable of performing a combat mission.141
When Oleksandr Turchinov (who was an acting President after Yanukovich fled
in 2014) asked General Tenyukh about the estimated numbers of Russian forces in
Crimea, Tenyukh answered:
On the Russian side in Crimea, in addition to the Black Sea Fleet, there is a
constant transfer of assault units of the armed forces and special forces of the
GRU of the General Staff of the Russian Federation. Already, the combat
component exceeds 20, 000 people. However, the number of Russian service
members, military equipment, and weaponry, constantly increases.142
Unfortunately, no matter how many recommendations and much guidance
General Tenyukh tried to provide to the Ukrainian government, all of them were ignored
because it seemed that the Ukrainian government still relied on diplomatic means (as
previously recommended by the Western partners) and hoped Ukrainian allies would start
acting soon.
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During one of O. Turchinov’s interviews143 on the channel called Crimea.
Realities, he shared some of his private conversations with American and European
partners. He noted that Ukrainian Westerns partners were not too keen on providing him
with weapons to protect Ukraine from Russian military invasion and recommended
instead abandoning mobilization of Ukrainian forces so as not to “provoke Russia:”
The aggression begins. I instruct to contact all our strategic partners and
guarantors of our security and demand the implementation of the Budapest
Memorandum. Ambassadors of leading states came to me immediately. Obama
sent me Joe Biden (then the US Vice President) and John Kerry (then the US
Secretary of State)... I spoke with Angela Merkel (Federal Chancellor of
Germany) and with many political leaders or their representatives. I was told:
‘The Budapest Memorandum is a political declaration. Our soldiers will not fight
on your side.’ So, the nuclear weapons were real [reference to denuclearization of
Ukrainian arsenal], and the treaty was a political declaration?
Thus, the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 seems to be rather a weak declaration
since all Ukraine got was denuclearization and a weakened position to protect itself
against non-other but one of the major authoritarian actors - Russia. All in all, it is
certainly interesting to see how this particular memorandum had a significant trading
point, where the Ukrainian side gave up a real object, and nothing substantial was
received in return from other signatories of the international agreement.
As the interview went on, Mr. Turchinov continued:
I asked them to at least help us with weapons. After all, then we were
catastrophically short of weapons and military equipment. And I was told: ‘Sorry,
we will help you only at the diplomatic level, only international diplomatic
assistance. Because military supplies will provoke Russia to intensify aggression.’
When they called me and asked to cancel the mobilization because we were
‘provoking Russia,’ I replied that we had no other options to defend the country…
The main conclusion I made during those terrible events was that each country
should rely only on itself. Our European partners are afraid of war.
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It seems that some of the Ukrainian partners did not want to acknowledge the lack
of Ukrainian military capabilities, despite countless requests from Ukrainian officials to
purchase weapons from its partners or allies. For example, the US Administration of
2014 had this exact explanation when they claimed “Washington believed Ukraine had
enough lethal aid and the types of weaponry requested for Ukraine would be of only
marginal value. They had also emphasized the need for a diplomatic outcome.” 144
Moreover, during one of the 2015 CNN interviews145 with President Obama,
commentator Fareed Zakaria asked the President if Russia was ready to settle a political
deal. The President responded:
You know, so far, what we’ve seen is a lot of talk in public – with Chancellor
Merkel and President [UNINTELLIGIBLE] and ourselves – in which he will say
one thing but his actions tell another tale. And what we’ve consistently seen is
that the separatists are Russian financed, Russian trained; their strategy comes
from Russia; Russian troops support them. And so we have not yet seen a
recognition on the part of the Kremlin that it is in Russia’s interests to resolve this
issue over the long term. So in addition to continuing to exact costs on Russia,
one of the most important things we can do is to continue to support the Ukrainian
economy and the reform efforts that are coming out of Kiev [Kyiv]... And so
we’re going to keep on these dual tracks – putting more pressure on Russia,
bolstering Ukraine, delivering a message to Mr. Putin that these off ramps and
diplomatic resolutions remain available.
Nonetheless, there seems to be a contradiction, since at first, President Obama
acknowledges that he knows how President Putin says one thing and then does another.
However, he also concludes that the best option is to support Ukraine economically but
still have “diplomatic resolutions remain available.” So if the first principle says that the
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Russian actor does not possess any credibility in his words, why would it be optimal to
follow the negotiation and diplomatic path?
Nevertheless, the US President also spoke about him not being “wildly optimistic
at this point that his [V. Putin’s] orientation changes, partly because the one thing that’s
been very successful for Mr. Putin is his politics...So he’s looking backwards, not
forwards, and perhaps, over time, he changes his mind.” Thus, in the meantime, “we just
have to make sure that we’re firm in protecting our allies and supporting the principles
that have maintained peace in Europe for the entire post-war period.”
Once again, Western society tried to approach the Russian “democratic” state
with its democratic values and ways of negotiating while not understanding that this
approach is not successful when it comes to authoritarian states. As a result, the
Ukrainian government could only rely on diplomatic (and humanitarian) aid since
military assistance was absent from its US allies. Furthermore, Ukraine also had to face
and struggle with the EU’s decision to place an arms embargo on Ukraine. Although the
EU Foreign Affairs Council did not issue a decision or a regulation, making this embargo
not legally binding but instead solely a political commitment, the EU members took it
extremely seriously and followed through with the “political commitment.”146
Nonetheless, to Ukraine’s fortune, the restriction to buy arms was eventually lifted from
both the US and European partners on July 16, 2014.
Thus, one should see why I emphasized the importance of the realist theory and
the efficiency of the constructivist approach in Chapter II, especially when considering
military invasions or when dealing with an authoritarian regime. In other words, because
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democratic or Western regimes hold different interpretations of the international order
and international law from that of authoritarian, the history of violent occupations,
invasions, and attacks from Russia onto Eastern Europe shall continue its cycle if the
Western world continues to ignore these significant contrasts between the Western and
the authoritarian-Russian world-views.
Nonetheless, like in other cases, here are some examples of Russian violations of
the international law due to the Russian annexation of Crimea and invasion of Eastern
Ukraine’s regions:147
1. Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, provides that “All
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”
2. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2625: “Reaffirming in terms of the
Charter of the United Nations that the maintenance of international peace and
security and the development of friendly relations and cooperation between
nations are among the fundamental purposes of the United Nations...”
3. Helsinki Accords signed at the closing meeting of the third phase of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
4. Budapest Memorandum of 1994.
5. Alma-Ata Protocol from December 21, 1991.
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i. This declaration, in particular, provided that the parties recognize
and respect each other’s territorial integrity and the inviolability of
existing borders.
6. Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the further
development of interstate relations dated June 23, 1992.
7. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine and the
Russian Federation dated May 31, 1997.
8. The agreement about the Ukrainian-Russian state border since January 28, 2003.

On the other hand, the tactics used in the events of occupation and later annexation of
Crimea:
1. Preparations beforehand for the future invasion of the targeted territory/state.
2. No declaration of war.
3. Engaging in international law and its obligations while using international
standards of cooperation as a tool of advancing Russian planning to further
seizing Ukraine’s territories.
4. Sending out countless servicemen and troops without acknowledging their
presence in the targeted state. Nonetheless, the deployment was initiated to attack
Ukrainian territories.
5. Disguising Russian soldiers as Ukrainian civilians, knowing the democratic states
will not shoot civilians. Meanwhile, when the Russian militia is present, it tends
to hind behind civilian backs.148
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6. “Intervention...only for the good of the people” or “Saving our brothers and
sisters” theme.
7. Using international leaders’ lack of understanding of Eastern European relation
with Russia throughout history (culturally, historically, politically), which, if not
for Russian propaganda, “we are all brothers,” might have had a better
understanding, and there was a less positive association of Eastern Europeans
with Russians.
i. “I expect Russia and Ukraine to have a strong relationship. They
are historically bound together in all sorts of cultural and social
ways...”149
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
The thesis’ folklore of “The One-Eyed Man And The Wicked Boar” has many
meanings, metaphors, and lessons. However, like history, this story also has an openended conclusion. In other words, what comes next depends on a next-generation or an
abrupt event. Although the story of these two characters (the One-Eyed Man or the
Western community with its international order and the Wicked Boar or the authoritarian
actor, Russia) allegedly ended in the 20th century, especially with the fall of the USSR,
the risks and uncertainties, as the history of 21st century shows, have not vanished.
Nevertheless, after consulting international theories of realism, liberalism, and especially
constructivism, as well as looking at different interactions between Eastern European
states and Russia with its authoritarian nature, the patterns show themselves immediately.
Although it might be upsetting to see such horrific historical events occur today, it should
be even more alarming to the Western leaders since the severe threat might be closer than
first presupposed.
One of the questions posed in Chapter I is about the relation between the case
study and the made-up folklore story. On the one hand, the examples presented in the
case study, which are: 1) Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918), 2) Soviet Invasion of Poland
(1939-1940), 3) Soviet Occupation of Baltic States (1939-1945), and 4) Russian
Annexation of Crimea (2014) can all represent the missing left eye of the Man. However,
what was sad to discover was the fact that the Man did not even try to defend his eye
equitably or, even when lost, try and get it back. Parallel to that, one would instantly
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remember the quotations from Chapter III, where various Western leaders negated the
necessity of helping Eastern European countries to come out of Soviet Russia’s shadow,
and instead, supported the idea of the region’s “cultural and historical similarities.”
Moreover, as FDR implied, “European people [rather Eastern European] will simply have
to endure Russian domination, in the hope that in ten or twenty years they will be able to
live well with the Russians.”150 Hence, it is arguable that the One-Eyed Man lost his left
eye, not in a fight against the Wicked Boar, but gave it away willingly, possibly hoping to
save some part of his household, and most importantly, to keep his right eye.
Unfortunately, the One-Eyed Man had miscalculated the outcome by a large
margin. As J. Mearsheimer once noted in his work, “Political competition among states is
a much more dangerous business than mere economic intercourse; the former can lead to
war, and war often means mass killing on the battlefields as well as mass murder of
civilians.”151 Therefore, the Wicked Boar came back to pay another visit to an old foe
when he annexed part of European regions in 2014, a piece of Ukraine, Crimean
Peninsula.
Nonetheless, it is essential to acknowledge that the One-Eyed Man found himself
in a grave position in the 20th century when a large part of his home was damaged and
taken away. However, it was not only the economic resources that the Eastern European
countries could have provided to the Western world, instead of having them taken away
by the Soviet authoritarians, but it was a missed opportunity to build a truly strong barrier
for Europe. As Mearsheimer said, “Even when a great power achieves a distinct military
advantage over its rivals, it continues looking for chances to gain more power. The
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pursuit of power stops only when hegemony is achieved,”152 which is something the
Russian Empire, Soviet Russia, and nowadays the Russian Federation, all have sought as
their primary goal.
To summarize the ultimate Russian goal or a dream in one sentence, one should
refer to the famous words of Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovsky, who is an old Russian
politician and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. Zhirinovsky explained
that Russians dream of a day “when Russian soldiers can wash their boots in the warm
waters of the Indian Ocean,”153 and he certainly did not mean a vacation-like trip.
Although Russia has many strategic ways of achieving such “dream,” it is also important
to add that Russia certainly knows how to utilize its “post-imperial ideology [that]
endows a sense of victimization, which in turn sets three foreign policy goals: to be
recognized and empathized with as a victim by others in the international system,
maximizing territorial sovereignty, and maximizing status. This ideology is also reflected
in behavioral patterns: these nation-states adopt the position of victim and cast those it
interacts with as victimizers, justify their international stances using a discourse of
oppression and discrimination, hold stricter views on territorial inviolability, and are
sensitive to perceived loss of face that relates to a desire to regain a 'lost' status.”154
J. Mearsheimer puts it similarly, where he talks about the period when a great
power starts to think and act offensively with regard to other states. As a result, three
general patterns of behavior appear: fear, self-help, and power maximization.155 When
applied to the Russian case, the analysis presumes that the “fear” component is connected
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to the all-known idea of Western powers wanting to “get Russia.” The idea of engaging
in a full-blown military conflict is somewhat fearful for the Russian Federation since
Russia’s previous engagement with the US, for example, brought the USSR to its fall.
The “self-help” portion of Mearsheimer’s theory mainly addresses the Russian
government’s engagements with its people as they emphasize and propagate the invasion
of foreign territories to be an act of freeing “Russian brothers and sisters,” even if those
“potential relatives” have no connections whatsoever. Lastly, the concept of “power
maximization” explains the overall mission of the Russia’s existence, which should have
come across quite clearly after examining the chapter on Eastern European case study.
Thus, the One-Eyed Man should have realized earlier on that “The root of the
problem is that power calculations alone do not determine which side wins a war. Clever
strategies, for example, sometimes allow less powerful states to defeat more powerful
foes.”156 The idea can be seen in the case of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, where a weak
state in cooperation with a powerful ally joined their military capabilities and
successfully dispatched the Red Army, the Bolshevik groups, and other Russian civilians
who were encroaching on Ukrainian domestic and international affairs.
As a result, maybe it was not in the One-Eyed Man’s best interest to give away a
perfectly healthy and functioning eye, hoping the Wicked Boar would be satisfied just
with that.
One of the other patterns seen throughout the four historical examples is the
notion that the Western world is not inclined to investigate and essentially learn about the
mechanics of Russian nature, which should be investigated through its people. Like any
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state, it is very important to look at its core, or its people, whose job is to keep its
government in check, which recently means holding and exhibiting democratic values.
However, such significant misunderstanding might be the key reason why the cycle of
Russian attacks has not been broken. Maybe, there is no desire to acknowledge that a
Wicked Boar is still a boar, especially if it shows up in a suit and starts to walk like a
man. In other words, if the One-Eyed Man represents a democratic regime, then the
Wicked Boar is an authoritarian regime suited up in a democratic packaging.
Nonetheless, to make the issue a bit clearer and to fathom what makes Russia a
long-standing authoritarian regime, it is crucial to look at the Russian people and their
goals for Russian state. Surely, there should be some answers.

Support for the Russian Authoritarian Regime
After the USSR was dissolved, the Russian leaders quickly gathered what was left
of the states who had yet to rebel and succeed, and called it the Russian Federation. To
keep up with the essential goal of creating a Russian world-system, where at first it was
meant to be a communist world, where after the rebranding, the officials decided to keep
up with the fashion and chose a democratic suit, all for the next Russian Empire to come
into being. All in all, as President Putin said in 2005, “The collapse of the Soviet Union
was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the twentieth century.157 Accordingly, this
single phrase shows Putin’s true intentions to rebuild or come back to the olden days,
where Russia was “the ‘boss’... of the synthetic state... strives to make the world believe
that the other nations are natural members of one big Russian family whose papa sits in
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the Kremlin.”158 Though, to see what Russian people seek in their leaders, one should
consider why the first President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, who served
from 1991 to 1999, decided to make Vladimir Putin (an ex-KGB official) his successor in
2000.
Generally speaking, Putin came to power because B. Yeltsin started to show
weakness and an inability to persuade his people that he was still their “tzar,” a Russian
leader with extreme power and a promise to build “Great Russia;” but mainly through
expansion. Therefore, after Chechnya declared its independence, right after the Soviet
Union collapsed in 1991, B. Yeltsin had to prove to the Russian people that he still
possessed the qualities they wanted in their leading face - supreme power. Thus, on
December 11, 1994, the Russian President signed a decree to employ a military operation
in the Chechen Republic and begin a war.159 However, Russian forces were not able to
succeed in restoring Chechnya to the Russian brotherhood, as Yeltsin promised his
people, since, on August 31, 1996, Russia settled for a peace agreement between the two
independent countries. The agreement presupposed Russian troops being entirely
removed from the Chechen Republic by December 31, 1996, and also required the
Russian Federation to recognize its independence.160 As The Guardian wrote in 1999
about the aftermath of Russian “defeat,” “Russian public opinion is notoriously fickle and
the mood could swing against Mr. Yeltsin.”161 Nonetheless, the public opinion indeed
caused the dreaded for the President internal pressure, which made Yeltsin resign by the
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end of 1999 and appoint his chosen successor, former Russian Prime Minister - Vladimir
Putin.
On the other hand, despite Yeltsin’s extreme popularity in the late 1980s and early
1990s, which even gathered praise from some international faces for “democratizing”
Russia, because he lost the violent war in Chechnya and essentially allowed it to break
away from Russia, the Russian society saw it as a weakening point for their state.
Therefore, because Yeltsin failed to show the expansionist Russian power, he was now
looked down on, if not hated, by the Russian population, leading to his last impeachment
allegations: guilty of treason, first-degree murder, and plotting to sell out Russia to the
West.162 As a result, Yeltsin announced his resignation on December 31, 1999, and in his
New Year speech, he asked the Russian people for forgiveness due to his past mistakes
and disappointments, hence declaring his successor to take over; rather unique New Year
present from President Yeltsin. Moreover, the reader should also understand the essence
of Russia’s character, which ultimately seeks chauvinistic-like power, since Vladimir
Putin had to grant the former President Yeltsin immunity from being prosecuted for his
failures.163 However, unlike his predecessor, Vladimir Putin understood what he needed
to give Russian people to stay in power. As The New York Times wrote in 2000, “Mr.
Putin, a former KGB official, has become Russia's most popular politician because of his
tough-minded conduct of the war in Chechnya. He is now more than ever considered a
strong favorite for the March elections.”164 Nonetheless, the current “tzar” seems to be
keeping his popularity and Russian throne, as he recently signed a law that allows him to
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become a leader of the Russian state for another two terms, until 2038,165 to plan out the
future of “the Great Russia,” with new territories in mind. Moreover, President Putin also
noted how far he is willing to go:
I hope that no one will think of crossing the so-called red line in relation to
Russia. And where it will take place - we will determine in each specific case
ourselves [he stressed]... However, if someone from foreign states perceives
Moscow’s good intentions as weakness and intends to “burn all bridges”, then this
country should know that Russia’s response will be “asymmetric, quick and
tough.”166
Therefore, after analyzing and looking at one of the modern examples (not to
dismiss the past patterns), one can conclude that the authoritarian regime which has been
representing the state for hundreds of years, couldn’t have survived and exist if it was not
for the all-around support of the populace. Hence, it is unfortunate to see how the
Western society continues to think of the masked authoritarian state or the Wicked Boar
as of itself or the One-Eyed Man. Although it is nevertheless true that the Boar suited up
and wears a tie today, such should not signify a drastic change. After all, if the One-Eyed
Man paid enough attention to the true historical facts of the Eastern European history and
its battles with Russia and did not submit to the “old Russian political tradition, [which]
ordered a rewriting of the early histories of Ukraine, White Ruthenia, and Muscovy
(Russia),”167 today’s dangers of Russian annexation could have been avoided. Moreover,
it is astonishing to see the cluelessness of many, since “Moscow not only complies
dishonest records of its own history, but reaches far back to distort and twist the
chronicles of earlier times to fit its propaganda,”168 which somehow still holds with the
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Western European education or politics as well as in the US. In other words, if the OneEyed Man was certain that the Wicked Boar could have benefited him at large, thus
trading his left eye for the possibility of the boar bringing him acorns but mostly leaving
him in peace, in the 21st century, such proved itself to be an inadequate strategy. To put it
differently, if Western Europe had chosen to fight instead of flight in the 20th century,
Russia would not have had a chance to grow economically, because as Lev E.
Dobriansky explained, “Russia would be a second-rate power if deprived of its
economically rich captive nations.”169
That being said, gathering human resources and food supplies for the Russian
state is the key principle to keep it afloat. One of main reasons for Russia to initiate an
armed aggression against Ukraine was always because of the systemic crisis of its
statehood. Even today, the continuous authoritarian hostility against Ukraine shows how
much Russian Federation seeks to absorb Ukraine, its material and human resources,
which serve as one of the key prerequisites to deploy the Russian Imperial Project.170
Thus, to reach the Russian-world-hegemony, where a big part of it was lost during the
fall of the USSR, Russia first needs to establish its control over Ukrainian territories. As
Immanuel Kant once said, “It is the desire of every state, or of its ruler, to arrive at a
condition of perpetual peace by conquering the whole world, if that were possible.”171
However, though the idea of Soviet unity with Eastern Europe was previously supported
by leaders like FDR, Churchill, and other influential officials, the world of “Russian
peace,” in reality, has a very different pretext and does not stop at the Eastern European
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border. The essential thinking had to be that because of the many engagements that
Eastern European countries had with Russia, their history, culture, and plans for the
future must be similar, which was nothing more than a fruit of well planted Soviet
Russian propaganda. However, even today, certain interviews and decision-making show
a similar perception of Russia and Eastern European states, which is not only unfortunate
but extremely dangerous for Western Europe.

Consequences And Theoretical Scenario
Nonetheless, suppose the perspective and thus the situation does not change. The
Western European community continues to hope for its eastern neighbors to be a
substantial pay-off to the Wicked Board like it was in the past century, while also hoping
that the suited-up Boar will not come for Man’s leftover crops, household, and most
importantly - his right eye. However, to change such a perspective on European
necessities, it might be extremely useful to consult, if not with the Eastern European
history, then with George Orwell's Animal Farm, which was inspired by the true and
horrific events of Russian totalitarianism in Eastern Europe, while also serving as an
inspiration in creating a tale for this thesis. On the other hand, to provide more substantial
evidence that there is an objective basis for authoritarian Russia having its boots on
Western European soil, it is beneficial to look at the events of 1945, the Division of
Germany.
Although Eastern European countries had to endure an uncivil Sovietauthoritarian regime for almost 50 years, and for others even longer, some of Western
Europe did have a chance to feel and go through similar experiences. The treatment of
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East Germany and its people from 1945 to 1989 is a common chapter in various historical
textbooks, where the creation of the wall was never attributed as pleasant or tolerable
enough event to live in. Moreover, it is commonly acknowledged how hard the
superpower leaders fought to break down the Berlin Wall and free the eastern portion of
Germany, where people were suffering so much they were fearless of bullets or death, if
that meant having a chance to reach the western side of the wall. With this image in
mind, let us move our attention to the Eastern European states that serve as the guideline
to this thesis.
Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, as well as other states were all
sacrificed one way or another and admittedly put on hold for almost a century by Western
leaders. Furthermore, after achieving their independence, these states were once again
conjectured to have similarities in culture, language, and history with their captor.
Therefore, if Western Europe mistakenly believes that possible and God-forbid,
successful Russian corruption of Eastern Europe will not affect those states located in
Western Europe and approach other continents down the road, it is at most important to
revisit the archives of the 20th century Eastern Europe and look at the precedent event of
the Division of Germany. The Russian position made in Crimea can be seen as a message
that the Wicked Boar is coming, and it is yet to have received what it wants. Furthermore,
though it might start with Ukraine, it is adequate to assume that Russian boots will not
stop there and be ready to reach Western borders with even more power, people, and
resources to occupy, seize, and invade.
Therefore, when the One-Eyed Man was close to losing his right eye (Division of
Germany), as the Wicked Boar got too close to him, the Man realized which seeds he
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planted to get such rotten fruit in the end. However, after the time had passed and the
Wicked Boar started to dress in a suit, the alertness and feeling of danger passed away,
and the One-Eyed Man went back to his usual back-scratching tactic, thinking that the
rebranded Wicked Boar will not want to get his right eye.
On the other hand, why is the One-Eyed Man not mad if the Wicked Boar steals
his crops and other resources? Why? Because the One-Eyed Man is missing his left eye,
it is helpful to imply that he does not see any issues happening, especially if it is of
convenience to him. In other words, he is using his missing left eye as an excuse if others
ask him if he does not notice what is happening to his farm, his household. However, let
us agree that the One-Eyed Man knows about these issues, but he might not want to
acknowledge them, thinking that he might make the Wicked Boar angry. Plus, he thinks,
“Has the Wicked Boar not changed and became a good neighbor?”
Despite all “but,” the lesson is clear. The nature of this Boar is wicked because he
wants it all, and he wants it now, not stopping till he gets the wanted object. As a result,
this leads one to question whether the Western allies are prepared to be willingly passive
with this problematic and dangerous behavior and continue believing in Russian
propaganda, and hence bear to witness another cycle of Russian territorial invasions,
occupation, and annexation, making the undeniable and clear evidence of the past seem
invisible once again.
Overall, this folklore entails many ideas, cautions, and overall predictions for the
future, since the result of the Russian occupation and Western response seem to follow
the same pattern for the past two centuries. Therefore, after losing stability and prosperity
in Eastern Europe and placing them under Russian influence and superiority (losing the
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left eye), the European continent has lost a significant part of its power. If we consult the
history of the European continent before Russia was successful in meddling in European
affairs to invade and corrupt, we see a strong European continent with multiple stable and
promising nations. Consequently, today, the international order and its leaders, the OneEyed Man, have a chance to bring their left eye back and put it back where it belongs,
turning the One-Eyed Man into a Man again.
Lastly, as Serhiy Plokhiy once noted in his work - Ukraine - is the gate of Europe,
and although at first, I only partially understood what the title meant, after spending
countless hours at various virtual historical archives, the realization of what has been
happening and what is meant to cycle back was surreal. During one of the days, while
researching the invasion of Poland, I stumbled across the official numbers of how many
Central Ukrainians, who already were dispatched from serving, were sent out to Poland.
The majority also came from Kyiv, which definitely took away all the air I had in my
lungs. It took me five seconds to regain my composure to re-read the words and numbers,
and then finally let out a wince because for some unknown reason, now, I was bawling
my eyes out, even though I have never met these Ukrainian men and never knew them.
Nevertheless, despite all, here I was, sitting and knowing that history is rather more
predictable than many think, knowing that I might be reading the possible future
scenario. And yes, maybe I did not know those men from the 20th century, but I know
many from the 21st, and it shocked and irritated me, as I realized that history and time
might have already prepared another verdict.
As a consequential ending, if the One-Eyed Man does not ultimately realize the
true nature of the Wicked Boar and continues using his missing left eye as an excuse,
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there might be a continuation of George Orwell’s story, but in a less literary form and
with horrific consequences for Western European and American future generations to
deal with as a result. However, no one said the story’s protagonist could not establish a
strong military alliance with the old Eastern European gatekeepers to ensure the
authoritarian agenda of the Wicked Boar does not spread beyond the Russian border.
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